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Chapter 1
Introduction
1 Introduction
This dissertation is a collection of four essays dealing with topics of the production of
health and health care finance. In almost all industrialized countries public health care
expenditure continues to increase at a faster pace than GDP. Thus, debate on health
policy often focuses on limiting the growth of health care spending. However, from an
economic perspective health care spending is justified as long as the marginal benefit
exceeds or equals its marginal cost. Chapters 2 and 3 deal with topics of the production
of health. While chapter 2 looks at the demand side of health, chapter 3 deals with the
supply side of health. Chapters 4 and 5 turn to questions related to health care finance.
Taking a new perspective on the production of health, chapter 2 attempts to explain
why countries are still spending on health although there is evidence of decreasing
marginal returns w.r.t health care expenditure (so called “flat-of-the-curve medicine”;
see e.g. Enthoven, 1980). Tracing a panel of 24 OECD countries over time, chapter
2 finds that uncertainty with regard to time to death (as measured by the standard
deviation of age at death) has declined over the past four decades. Assuming that
individuals are risk-averse with regard to their health, this reduction of uncertainty
may well justify health care spending. Estimating a modified production function,
chapter 2 finds that health care expenditure has significantly reduced the standard
deviation of age at death. Furthermore, willingness to pay for such a risk reduction
exceeds marginal health care expenditure of the United States and Switzerland,
implying that additional health care expenditure may be worth its cost.
Chapter 3 determines whether there are economies of scale in the production of health.
While health was measured on the aggregated country level in chapter 2, micro-level
data is used in chapter 3. Based on the observation that 5-year survival rates for breast
cancer vary by more than 10 percent across U.S. regions, the factors contributing to
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4the different survival rates are analyzed. The results indicate that patients tend to
survive longer (than the US average) in those regions where relatively more cancers
of the same type exist. One likely explanation for this finding is, that the relatively
higher prevalence of cancers in some regions has lead to greater accumulation of
disease-specific knowledge and experience which translated into improved health
outcomes.
However governments facing the pressure of public health care expenditure not only
just limit the growth of health care expenditure but also seek ways to supply health
care efficiently. Chapter 4 deals with health care reforms that attempt to increase
competition between providers of health care and health insurers in order to raise
the overall performance of health care systems. One finding of this chapter is that
increasing competition also requires an appropriate institutional setting such as an
adequate risk adjustment. However, as chapter 5 shows, refining the risk adjustment
scheme turns out to be a difficult task triggering unintended side effects which in turn
may reduce the overall performance of a health care system.
In the Netherlands, Germany, and Switzerland Managed Care has been one of the
preferred options to increase the performance of their health care system. By vertically
integrating health insurance and health care provision, Manged Care attempts to
improve the allocation of resources in health care while limiting health care expendi-
ture. Chapter 4 evaluates elements of Managed Care of these three insurance-based
countries with regard to their contribution to the performance of the entire health care
system. The country comparison reveals that Managed Care depends stongly on the in-
stitutional setting. The more freedom to contract between consumers, health insurers,
and health care service providers, the greater its contribution to the health care system.
Even though most of the literature emphasizes the effect of Managed Care as a
device to improve the allocation of resources in health care, health insurers can
also use Managed Care to attract favorable risks or to deter unfavorable ones. As a
consequence, Switzerland is refining its risk adjustment formula, including a third
indicator (beside age and gender) “hospitalization of more than three days in the
previous year”. Chapter 5 addresses the consequences of this refinement for an
individual Swiss health insurer. Due to its high share of Managed Care contracts (and
therefore low hospitalization rates of its insureds), payments into the risk adjustment
Introduction 5
scheme are predicted to explode. The likely response of the insurer’s risk management
is to extend hospital stays beyond three days, which runs counter stated policy
objectives. While the fine-tuning of the risk adjustment scheme decreases risk selection
efforts, it likely discourages health insurers applying Managed Care in general. Thus,
cost savings through Managed Care that are not attributable to risk selection ef-
forts will be lost as well, resulting in a further increase of public health care expenditure.
Note that Peter Zweifel co-authored chapters 2, 4, and 5, Frank Lichtenberg co-
authored Chapter 3, and Miche`le Sennhauser co-authored Chapter 5. Chapter 4
appeared in the Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics. Chapter 5 is published in
the International Journal of the Economics of Business.
Johannes Schoder
Zurich, February 2011
Chapter 1
Flat-of-the-curve Medicine: A New
Perspective on the Production of Health
Johannes Schoder and Peter Zweifel
Submitted to
Health Economics Review
2 Flat-of-the-curve Medicine: A New Perspective
on the Production of Health
2.1 Introduction and motivation
Industrial countries have been spending a rising share of their economic resources on
health care. From 1960 to 2004 health care expenditure (HCE) of OECD countries
increased from 3.8 percent of GDP to 8.9 percent on average. Over the same period,
health outcomes measured by average life expectancy at birth improved from 68.4
to 78.5 years. However, this increase has slowed recently. In the United States
e.g., it has been 0.19 percent p.a. between 1980 and 2004, down from 0.3 between
1960 and 1980. Since HCE continued to grow at a rate of 7.7 percent p.a. between
1980 and 2004, this has often been interpreted as evidence of decreasing marginal
returns (“flat-of-the-curve medicine”; Enthoven, 1980, Fuchs, 2004), raising the ques-
tion of why citizens and governments failed to reallocate resources away from medicine.
However, calling for such reallocation may be premature on at least two accounts.
First, several studies find that marginal returns to HCE still outweigh its marginal
cost (Cutler and McClellan, 2001, Murphy and Topel, 2006, Lichtenberg, 2007a).
This would explain why, in countries where individual willingness to pay for medical
services tends to prevail over political considerations of cost control (such as the
United States, the Netherlands, and Switzerland), the share of HCE in the GDP
keeps increasing. Second, the implicit assumption that individuals only value changes
in the expected value of health status is open to criticism. If people are risk-averse
with regard to their health, they value a reduction in the variance of health status
even if its expected value does not change. Thus, judging the benefits of HCE by its
marginal product in terms of expected health (as traditionally done in studies of the
production of health) possibly neglects the willingness to pay of risk-averse individuals
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for reduced uncertainty surrounding their health status.
Following up on this second aspect, this study seeks to determine whether the
marginal cost in terms of HCE matches its marginal benefit if the reduction in
uncertainty surrounding life expectancy is accounted for. In order to do this, we will
proceed as follows. First, a conventional production function with life expectancy
as the dependent variable is reestimated to verify that the countries of our sample
are characterized by flat-of-the-curve medicine. Second, we examine whether a
reduction of uncertainty surrounding life expectancy indeed occurred over the past
46 years. Third, based on the econometric estimation of an appropriately modified
health production function we determine the relative contribution of medical and
non-medical inputs to reduced uncertainty. Finally, we compare the marginal cost
of HCE with its marginal benefit in terms of willingness to pay for reduced uncertainty.
We find HCE as well as GDP to be significant determinants of the variance of health
status. A 10 percent increase of HCE is estimated to lead to a 0.42 percent reduction
of the standard deviation of life years. Furthermore, according to our calculations
willingness to pay both in the United States and Switzerland for such a reduction
exceed the extra HCE, implying that additional HCE may be worth its cost as
”real insurance”, bringing back health status to normal when illness strikes. Hence,
flat-of-the curve medicine need not be wasteful.
Our study is closely related to the empirical literature on the production of health
(e.g. Auster et al., 1969, Miller and Frech, 2000, Thornton, 2002, Shaw et al., 2005,
and Zweifel et al., 2005). However, rather than assessing the contribution of inputs
exclusively to the expected value of health status, it estimates their impact on the
variability of health status as well. Furthermore, this work complements studies
conducted on the individual level deriving willingness-to-pay values for health risk
reductions either from experiments (see e.g. Cameron et al., 2010) or from utility-
theoretic models (see e.g. Edwards, 2008).
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The general background is pre-
sented in Section 2.2. Section 2.3 is devoted to the description of the data. Section 2.4
contains the econometric specification. Estimation results are presented and discussed
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in Section 2.5. Section 2.6 provides estimates of the willingness to pay for more certain
health. Section 2.7 concludes with a summary of key findings.
2.2 Risky health: Valuation and measurement
The basic hypothesis underlying this work is that individuals have preferences with
regard to health profiles that are reflected in survival curves and their development
over time. As a convenient starting point, consider the two hypothetical health profiles
of Figure 2.1. Health profile A presumably represents the ideal of western lifestyle,
living in perfect health followed by sudden death, indicated by a health status of zero
(Fries, 1980). In contrast, health profile B represents an alternative where health status
deteriorates with age but remains positive up to a higher age, indicating survival. The
two profiles can also be interpreted as reflecting the probability of being in perfect
health, which starts at 100 percent and stays there (profile A) or decreases with age
(profile B). Thus, they represent cumulative distribution functions (cdfs), defined over
the absence of death rather than (say) wealth. Even if profile B should have higher
expected value, they can still be ranked in terms of second-order stochastic dominance
(see e.g Laffont (1999), ch. 2.5). In the present case, the triangle-like area above profile
B (indicating the cumulative difference between the two cdfs) exceeds the extra area
below profile B. In this event, an individual who is risk-averse with regard to health
status prefers profile A. He or she has a positive willingness-to-pay (WTP) for living
in a country with a health profile A rather than B.
Figure 2.1: Ranking of two health profiles
Health
status
$
100
%
Age
12
Health profiles of this type are not available at this time. However, if individuals are
successful in moving from profile B to the more rectangular profile A, they should
in the aggregate exhibit an increasingly rectangular survival curve because survival
constitutes the necessary (but not sufficient) condition for being in perfect health.
Therefore, variability of age at death will be used as an indicator of uncertainty
surrounding health status.
Various indicators of variability of age at death (VAD) are used in the literature such
as the interquartile range (Wilmoth and Horiuchi, 1999), the Gini coefficient (Shkol-
nikov et al., 2003 and Peltzman, 2009), and the standard deviation (Kannisto, 2000).
Regardless of choice of indicator, these studies document a secular decline in VAD
for industrial countries, albeit at a somewhat reduced rate during the most recent
decades. This development is tantamount to a rectangularization of the survival curve
(see Figure 2.2 showing the case of Sweden). In keeping with the argument above, it is
interpreted as evidence of individual’s improved control over their health status. Note
also that this improvement increasingly is reflected in the neighborhood of the nearly
vertical segment of the nearly rectangular survival curve, calling for a special focus on
the VAD of the elderly.
Figure 2.2: Rectangularization of the survival curve in Sweden
0
2
4
6
8
10
Su
rv
ivo
rs
 in
 1
,0
00
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110
Age in years
1751 1960
1980 2007
Source: Human Mortality Database (2008).
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What this evidence is silent about is how individuals might have achieved this added
control. In analogy with the production of health literature, it would be interesting
to know whether the major contribution came from medical or non-medical inputs.
To the authors’ knowledge, there is only one study that relates a measure of VAD
to medical and non-medical inputs (Le Grand, 1987). Due to data limitations, Le
Grand (1987) performs but a cross-sectional regression for 1982 including 17 OECD
countries. He relates public HCE, total HCE, GDP per capita, and a measure of
income inequality (the share of the bottom quintile in national income) to the Gini
coefficient of mortality. Public HCE has the expected negative impact on VAD but
remains insignificant. Surprisingly, total HCE has a positive impact, whereas a higher
GDP per capita and less income inequality are associated with lower VAD. However,
the Gini coefficient is not translation independent (i.e. it changes if mean age at
death differs between two periods or countries although the absolute differences
between individuals’ ages at death are the same). As to the interquartile range, it
violates the transfer principle (it ignores a change in the distribution of deaths within
a given age class if the number of deaths in that class does not change). For this
reason, the standard deviation will be used as an indicator of VAD in the analysis below.
The present study extends previous work in three ways. First, it uses panel data tracing
24 OECD countries1 over the past 45 years, permitting to test the robustness of the
results found by Le Grand (1987). Second, since the relative contribution of medical
and non-medical inputs may well change with age, VAD among the elderly (where
rectangularization of the survival curve has been especially marked, see Figure 2.2)
is examined in particular. Third, using evidence on the willingness to pay (WTP) for
health risk reduction, WTP values are calculated for the two countries with the highest
HCE per capita, the United States and Switzerland. These values are compared with
the extra HCE to determine whether flat-of-the-curve medicine may be still worthwhile
thanks to its effect on VAD. However, to address these research questions we first have
to determine whether the countries of our sample indeed operate (on average) on the
flat-of-the-curve. In sum, this leads to the following four research questions:
Q1: Are the countries of our sample characterized by flat-of-the-curve medicine?
1These are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Germany,
Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Slovak
Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the United States.
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Q2: Do medical or non-medical inputs contribute more to reducing variability of age
at death (VAD)?
Q3: Are these effects different for VAD among the elderly?
Q4: Is flat-of-the-curve medicine wasteful?
2.3 Data
Data to compute the dependent variables used below (remaining female life expectancy
at age 60 and two measures of variability of age at death) are obtained from the
Human Mortality Database (2008) (HMD). The Human Mortality database provides
two different variants of life tables, cohort and period life tables. The former represent
the mortality experience of individuals who are born in the same year and thus are
truly comparable. However, cohort life tables contain complete mortality information
only on cohorts without any survivors left. By way of contrast, period life tables show
the estimated number of survivors at age x if a hypothetical birth cohort of 100,000
born today have the mortality rates that are observed today for people at various ages
up to x (Human Mortality Database, 2008).2
Therefore remaining female life expectancy at age 60 (LEF60) and the standard de-
viation of age at death (sd) are calculated from life tables as follows. LEF60 is the
weighted average of age at death above 60, x− 60, with weights given by the number
of females dying at the respective age, dx, relative to the number of survivors at age
60, l60
LEF60 =
ω∑
x=60
dx · (x− 60)
l60
=
ω∑
x=60
fx · (x− 60), (2.1)
where ω the maximum age in the life table. This variable will be used to check
whether industrial countries indeed are on the flat-of-the-curve with regard to HCE
(see Section 2.5.1 below).
The overall sd of age at death is given by
SD =
√
V ar =
√√√√
ω∑
x=0
fx(x− le)2, (2.2)
2A disadvantage of period life tables is that they are based on one-year age intervals.
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with le symbolizing life expectancy at birth. In keeping with Figure 2.1, perfect rectan-
gularization means a vertical drop of the health (and hence survival) profile. The age
at which the greatest number of a cohort’s members die approximates best this verti-
cal drop. Therefore, the standard deviation above the mode will be used to measure
compression of mortality, which increasingly occurs at higher ages (see the example of
Sweden again in Figure 2.2). The sd above the mode is calculated in analogy to the
overall sd,
SDmode =
√√√√
ω∑
x=mode
fx(x−mode)2. (2.3)
To test the robustness of the sd measure, we provide results for the Gini coefficient
in the Appendix. The overall sd and the Gini coefficient exhibit a similar downward
trend between 1960 and 1995 when averaged over 24 OECD countries3 see Figures
2.5 and 2.6 of the Appendix. Figures 2.7 and 2.8 of the Appendix trace the overall
sd and the Gini coefficient for six selected countries. The pattern of decline confirms
the similarity between the two measures. Interestingly, the ranking between countries
changed over time. In 1960, the Italians, Portuguese, and Japanese faced higher
uncertainty of age at death than U.S. citizens (up to 7 years in terms of sd). However,
by 2005 Americans faced considerably higher VAD than the citizens of these countries
(almost 3 years in terms of sd).
The sd above the mode exhibits a less regular pattern than both the overall and the
Gini coefficient, mainly due to shifts in the age with maximum mortality. It remains
roughly constant in the 1960s and 70s but has declined since 1980 (see Figure 2.3
below). Figure 2.9 of the Appendix shows that rectangularization at higher ages differs
considerably between the six selected countries. It has declined for all six countries
(except for the United States); however, the pattern of decline is again less regular than
that of the overall sd and the Gini coefficient.In sum, the indicators for VAD confirm
the findings of previous studies (see Section 2.2). They suggest that individuals in
industrialized countries have been exposed to less uncertainty regarding their longevity
(and presumably health status) since the 1960s, although differences between countries
and subperiods (especially for the sd above the mode) persist. The more the ques-
tion of what may have contributed to these differential developments gains importance.
3The correlation between the two measures is 0.97.
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Figure 2.3: Standard deviation above the mode averaged over 24 OECD countries, 1960
to 2005
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Source: Human Mortality Database (2008).
We defined medical and non-medical inputs drawing on the literature of the production
of health (Auster et al., 1969, Miller and Frech, 2000, Thornton, 2002, Shaw et al.,
2005, and Zweifel et al., 2005). Due to missing values in the OECD health data base
only the following determinants are retained. These are GDP per capita and alcohol
consumption per capita in liters for the non-medical and health care expenditure
per capita for the medical input. The OECD data is known for some problems. One
of them is national differences with regard to the delimitation of the health care
sector, resulting in different baskets of services, another the lack of comparability
and precision of health care deflators. In the case of countries such as Switzerland
or the Netherlands, HCE covered by basic health insurance are termed private HCE
although basic insurance is mandatory and regulated by the government.4 In view
of these difficulties, HCE is not split into private and public HCE (contrary to Le
Grand, 1987). Furthermore, HCE is not deflated using national price indexes but by
the exchange rate when converting the figures into USD, thus avoiding PPP indicators
that may contain additional meassurement error (see Gerdtham and Jo¨nsson, 1991).
4E.g. premiums for the basic mandatory coverage are not risk-rated.
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The sample comprising the 24 countries is characterized in Table 2.1 below. As to sd
as the indicator of VAD, it decreases from 19.34 years in 1960 to 14.74 years in 2005.
Decomposition of sd suggests that within-country differences (sdw) are rather more
important than between-country ones (sdb), indicating that decreases over time are the
primary source of variation. Turning to the independent variables, one observes slower
growth of HCE and GDP in recent years. Whereas total HCE and GDP per capita
increased by factors of 13 and 8, repectively between 1960 and 1983, these factors
decreased to 4.5 and 3.5 between 1983 and 2005.Interestingly, alcohol consumption per
Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics of variables, selected years
Variable Mean 1960 1983 2005 sdo sdb sdw N
LEF60 21.64 18.84 21.38 24.54 2.11 1.22 1.75 997
SD 16.81 19.34 16.44 14.74 1.76 0.97 1.49 1,102
GINI 11.55 13.73 11.24 9.68 1.63 0.92 1.35 1,101
SDmode 4.17 4.34 4.33 3.81 0.39 0.19 0.35 1,102
HCE 1,283 60.25 792.28 3,436 1,187 636.22 1068 838
GDP 13,866 1,341 10,287 35,782 11,903 7,787 10,780 965
ALC 10.62 7.87 11.81 9.41 3.66 3.27 1.78 1,003
Note: Gini is multiplied by 100. The countries included are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada,
Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Nether-
lands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom,
United States.
capita (ALC) increased first but has been diminishing after reaching a peak in the mid
1970s. As to the decomposition of the standard deviation of the independent variables,
variation over time again exceeds the between standard deviation (sdb), except for
alcohol consumption.
2.4 Econometric specification
One way to assess the contribution of a set of inputs to remaining female life
expectancy at age 60 (LEF60) and variability of age at death (VAD) is by eliminating
certain causes of death from the data (see Shkolnikov et al., 2003, Wilmoth and
Horiuchi, 1999, but also Andreev, 1982, and Lamber and Aronson, 1993). However,
comparing different countries over time entails the problem that this contribution
may be conditioned by country-specific characteristics (e.g. the type of health care
system). In contrast, econometric techniques designed for panel data permit to control
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for heterogeneity between countries either through fixed or random effects. In the
fixed effects (FE) approach, the country-specific effects, ci, are included in the set of
independent variables as a set of country-specific dummies. Alternatively, the ci can
be netted out by measuring all variables as differences from their country-specific
means. The random effects (RE) approach assumes the ci to be stochastic, which
means they must be uncorrelated with the independent variables for unbiased
parameter estimation. Both the RE and FE estimation were found to suffer from
heteroskedasticity, reflecting cross-sectional correlation of error terms in Eqs. (2.4) and
(2.5) below. Correcting for heteroskedasticity with a first-order autoregressive error
term [AR(1) process] and applying the Hausman test we find that RE is preferred
over FE throughout at the 5 percent significance level or better.
However, two additional issues need to be clarified. First, medical and non-medical
inputs were found to influence remaining life expectancy with a lag by Zweifel et al.
(2005). The same may be true for our sample. Alcohol consumption, for instance, likely
does not undermine control over one’s health immediately but rather over the course
of years. Likewise, earlier HCE may also contribute to higher LEF60 and lower VAD,
repsectively. As to GDP, it is interpreted as representing the budget contraint rather
than an indicator of life style, which argues against the introduction of a lag. Based on
the Hausman test, we choose an optimal lag length of 10 years for HCE and ALC in
Eq. (2.4) and 5 years for HCE in Eq. (2.5), values that seem to be reasonable in view
of earlier research. The other issue is endogeneity. LEF60 and VAD may feed back to
HCE. Countries where individuals live shorter or face higher uncertainty with regard
to longevity may spend more on HCE than countries where individuals live longer or
face less uncertainty. Such a feedback would likely occur through the political process,
in analogy to the feedback relationship found by Zweifel et al. (2005). However, the
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test (Durbin, 1954 and Hausman, 1978) for endogeneity does
not reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity of HCE at the one percent level.
Based on the econometric specification of Le Grand (1987) and the conventional health
production approach (see e.g. Zweifel et al., 2005) the following specification is esti-
mated [note that the variables in Eq. (2.4) are in logarithms]:
LEF60it = α0 + α1HCEit−10 + α2HCE
2
it−10 + α3GDPit + α4GDP
2
it (2.4)
+α5ALCit−10 + α6ALC
2
it−10 + ci + γt + uit.
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V ADit = β0 + β1HCEit−5 + β2HCE
2
it−5 + β3GDPit + β4GDP
2
it (2.5)
+β5ALCit−10 + β6ALC
2
it−10 + ci + γt + uit.
The dependent variables are,
• LEF60: Remaining female life expectancy at age 60.
• V AD: Variability of age at death of country i in year t measured by the overall
sd and the sd above the mode, calculated according to Eqs. (2.1), (2.3).
The independent variables are,
• HCE
−5: Total private and public HCE per capita, nominal but converted in 1,000
USD. Devoting more resources to health care is expected to enhance control over
health status, and hence higher LEF60 and lower VAD, repectively. Therefore,
α1 is predicted to be poitive and β1 to be negative.
• GDP : GDP per capita in 1,000 USD, nominal but converted in 1,000 USD. This
variable first of all reflects the budget contraint. Now, length of life and control
over one’s health status is quite likely a normal good, the demand for which
increases with average income, ceteris paribus. Second, however, average income
is importantly determined by labor productivity. To the extent that non-market
and market productivity develop in a similar way, a higher value of GDP reflects
a population that is better able to control their health status. In this way, GDP
also serves as an overall indicator of non-medical inputs. Both arguments suggest
a positive sign for α3 and a negative sign for β3.
• ALC
−10: Annual consumption of pure alcohol in liters per person above the age
of 15. Lower values indicate a healthier lifestyle implying improved health and
control over health status. Hence, α5 is predicted to be positive and β5 to be
negative.
• ci: A set of country-specific dummies.
• γt: A set of year-specific dummies to control for a possible time trend.
• uit: A stochastic error term, assumed to be i.i.d. normal.
20
2.5 Estimation results
2.5.1 Checking for flat-of-the-curve medicine
Table 2.2 presents RE estimation results for (arithmetic) LEF60. This choice of de-
pendent variable permits a comparison with Zweifel et al. (2005), who estimated the
same specification, but using a different sample5. In general, the estimated coefficients
roughly correspond with these earlier estimates values (see column entitled ZSE of
Table 2.2). In keeping with these earlier estimates, HCE exhibits decreasing marginal
returns.
Table 2.2: Determinants of remaining life expectancy for females at age 60, 1960-2005
Coef. z P>z Coef.
LEF60 (ZSE)
a
HCE
−10 1.143 3.4 0.001 2.045**
HCE2
−10 -0.341 -2.78 0.005 -0.565**
GDP 0.0602 3.01 0.003 0.122**
GDP 2 -0.001 -2.99 0.003 -0.004**
ALC
−10 -0.060 -2.63 0.298 -0.043
ALC2
−10 -0.002 -1.16 0.245 0.002
constant 19.537 0.394 49.64 18.57
rhoar 0.904
Wald χ2 714.24
Prob>χ2 0.904
R-squared 0.4976
Observations 631
Note: **p<0.01.aEstimates from Zweifel et al. (2005).
With regard to remaining life expectancy, the critical value of HCE beyond which its
marginal effect ceases to be positive can be put at USD 1,675.6 With a mean value of
USD 3,436 as of 2005 OECD countries on average are well within the flat-of-the-curve
range. Therefore, as to research question Q1 stated in Section 2.2, we can conclude
5They included consumption of kilocalories per capita as an additional lifestyle variable, which
however turned out to be not significant.
6From Table 2.2, one obtains the critical value beyond which e(LEF, HCE) decreases: ∂LEF
∂HCE
=
1.143 − 2 · 0.341HCE = 0. This yields HCE=1.675 or 1,675 USD respectively, which is in the same
range as the critical value estimated in Zweifel et al. (2005).
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that the countries in our sample operate on the flat-of-the curve.
However, this traditional view on the production of health may well neglect the impact
of HCE on the uncertainty surrounding life expectancy. This is addressed in Section
2.5.2.
2.5.2 Variability of age at death as the dependent variable
Table 2.3 presents (double-log) RE estimation results for sd and sdmode, the two indi-
cators of variability of age at death emphasized here. For a comparison with Table 2.2,
elasticities of LEF60 evaluated at the means are provided in the column entitled Table
2.2. Three things are noteworthy. First, the same inputs that were found to increase
(decrease) the expected value are estimated to decrease (increase) the variability of life
expectancy. Second, whereas GDP is more effective than HCE in increasing the ex-
pected value (see fifth column), it tends to be less effective in reducing its variability of
longevity. Third, HCE exhibits decreasing returns also as an instrument for controlling
variability of health status.
Table 2.3: Determinants of variability of age at death, 1960-2005
sd Table 2.2 sdmode
Coef. z P>z ǫ Coef. z P>z
VAD LEF60
HCE
−5 -0.072 -3.09 0.002 0.028 -0.019 -0.27 0.788
HCE2
−5 0.005 2.65 0.008 0.002 0.28 0.783
GDP -0.066 -1.99 0.046 0.043 -0.006 -0.03 0.980
GDP 2 0.004 0.94 0.345 0.001 0.06 0.955
ALC
−10 0.049 1.29 0.198 -0.009 0.210 2.17 0.030
ALC2
−10 0.017 1.87 0.061 -0.046 -1.97 0.049
constant 3.435 11.47 0.000 1.321 1.43 0.154
rhoar 0.786 0.237
Wald χ2 1,103 280.46
Prob>χ2 0.000 0.000
R-squared 0.6390 0.3407
Observations 631 631
Turning to the detailed estimation results for the overall standard deviation in
Table 2.3, we find HCE
−5 to be significant and with the predicted negative
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sign. Evaluated at the mean values, a 10 percent increase of HCE five years
earlier is estimated to reduce the current standard deviation of age at death by
10 · (−0.072 + 2 · 0.005 · lnHCE
−5) = 0.42 percent. The effect of non-medical inputs
is in the same range, with an increase of GDP by 10 percent associated with a
decrease of variability by 0.66 percent (negelecting the insignificant squared term).
As predicted, an unhealthy lifestyle proxied by ALC
−10 seems to weaken control over
health status. An earlier increase of alcohol consumption by 10 percent increases VAD
by an estimated 0.49 percent (again neglecting the squared term).
For the standard deviation above the mode, the results are quite different. Only alcohol
consumption is significant at the 5 percent level, with a similar estimated effect. A 10
percent increase 10 years earlier goes along with a 10 · (0.210− 2 · 0.046 · lnALC
−10) =
0.26 percent increase of the standard deviation above the mode. Especially at older
ages, unhealthy lifestyle in the past seems to induce lack a of control over health
status. Still, the insignificant coefficients pertaining to HCE come as a surprise because
according to e.g. Miller and Frech (2000), health status of the elderly (measured by
their remaining life expectancy) appears to have strongly benefited from pharmaceuti-
cal innovation in particular. The apparant contradiction may be resolved by referring
back to Figure 2.3. There, it appears that HCE may have influenced variability of
age at death among the elderly only in recent years, possibly due to medical progress
for the treatment of old-age diseases (e.g. circulatory and respiratory diseases and
cancers). The graph suggests reestimation of the model for the time period between
1983 to 2005. Results are presented in Table 2.4 below.
Now, HCE
−5 turns out to be significant at the 5 percent level, with a 10 percent in-
crease serving to reduce variability of age at death by an estimated 0.56 percent. Almost
the same magnitude is found for GDP. However, ALC
−10 is found to be insignificant.
Also note that the estimated coefficients pertaining to HCE and GDP cannot be dis-
tinguished from those for the overall sd in Table 2.2. Therefore, as to the research
question Q2 stated in Section 2.2, we can conclude that both medical and non-medical
inputs contribute to the observed reduction in VAD, and to a comparable extent. As to
research question Q3, the answer depends on the period of observation. For the period
as a whole (1960 to 2005), the elderly seem to differ in that VAD above the modal year
cannot be related to either HCE or GDP. However, from the mid-1980s on, these two
variables have effects that are comparable to those on the general population.
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Table 2.4: Determinants of variability of age at death above the modal year (sdmode),
1983-2005
Explanatory Coef. z P>z
variable
HCE
−5 -0.056 -2.49 0.013
HCE2
−5 0.005 0.47 0.639
GDP -0.058 -2.97 0.001
GDP 2 0.002 0.15 0.881
ALC
−10 0.061 0.28 0.776
ALC2
−10 -0.017 -0.36 0.719
constant 1.774 5.52 0.000
rhoar 0.217
Wald χ2 2,284
Prob>χ2 0.000
R-squared 0.2921
Observations 430
2.6 Is flat-of-the-curve medicine wasteful?
In Section 2.5.1, evidence was presented to the effect that many OECD countries
presently are characterized by flat-of-the-curve medicine if the marginal contribution
of HCE to remaining life expectancy is accepted as the criterion. However, according
to the conclusion of Section 2.5.2, HCE does contribute to reduced uncertainty with
regard to health status. In the present context, this effect is valued using the risk
premium an individual would be willing to pay for reducing the risk of premature
death indicated by the variability of age at death (VAD).
Theoretically, the risk premium can be derived from the following equality condition
that makes an individual indifferent between the certain health status A after deduction
of the premium ρ(X˜) and the risky health profile B of Figure 2.1. In Eq. (2.6) below,
u[HA] denotes the certain utility associated with certain health A (in money equivalent)
and EU , expected utility associated with risky health B, which is composed of HA and
a small variation X˜ of health status,
u[HA − ρ(X˜)] = EU [HA + X˜]. (2.6)
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Applying Taylor approximations to both sides and solving for ρ(X˜), one obtains the
Arrow-Pratt formula in terms of health rather than wealth (see Arrow, 1970, ch. 3)
ρ(X˜) =
1
2
σ2x · RA, (2.7)
with RA := −u
′′[HA]
u′[HA]
defining the coefficient of absolute risk aversion. The risk premium
therefore is given by the product of (one half of) the variance of health status, σ2x, and
the coefficient of absolute risk aversion. Now, risk aversion with regard to a variation
in health may well differ from risk aversion with regard to wealth. Therefore, it is im-
portant to use an estimate that has a close connection to health. The one by Friedman
(1974) qualifies because it is derived from the choice of health insurance. His value of
RA is 3 · 10−3; in the interest of a conservative estimate of the risk premium, we use a
value of RA equal to 10
−4. The next step is to express the variance of length of life (as
an indicator of health), σ2x, in monetary units. This will be done for the two countries
that devote very high per-capita amounts to health care and therefore likely constitute
two extreme cases of flat-of-the curve medicine, the United States and Switzerland.
The United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA, 2000) has been using
a value of USD 6.3 mn. per statistical life in its cost-benefit analyses since 1999.
Baranzini and Luzzi (2001) estimate an average value of CHF 12.5 mn. for Switzerland
based on labor market data as of 1995. Taking the base year 2000 and an interest rate
of 3 percent, this amounts to a value of a statistical life of USD 6.5 mn. for the United
States and USD 8.7 mn. for Switzerland (with and an exchange rate of 1CHF=0.6USD).
Given that the two estimates above relate to statistical lives and hence are the result
of a linear extrapolation of small changes in survival porbabilities, it is also admissible
to interpret them as linear extrapolations of a change of one year of life expectancy.
With average life expectancies of 73.8 years (United States) and 76.2 (Switzerland)
respectively, one statistical year of life is worth USD 87,927 in the United States and
USD 114,102 in Switzerland. Based on a utility-theoretic model of preferences over
length of life, Edwards (2008) predicts that an individual would be willing to trade
one-half a year of additional life expectancy against a reduction of uncertainty by
one standard deviation. Therefore, a change of one sd in age at death can be valued
at some USD 43,963 (United States) and USD 57,051 (Switzerland), respectively.
According to the estimation results in Section 5.2, a 10 percent increase of HCE is
estimated to reduce the sd by 0.42 percent, i.e. from 18.01 to 17.93 years in the US
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and from 16.24 to 16.17 in Switzerland.
Inserting these estimates into Eq. (2.7) we obtain the following willingness-to-pay
(WTP) values for such a reduction:
1
2
((18.01)2 − (17.93)2)(4.40 · 104)2 · 10−4 = 2.78 · 105 (United States) (2.8)
1
2
((16.24)2 − (16.17)2)(5.71 · 104)2 · 10−4 = 3.25 · 105 (Switzerland) (2.9)
Distributed over 73.8 years this becomes a WTP value for the United States of USD
3,771 and USD 4,261 for Switzerland.
The last step concerns the marginal cost. In 2000, the United States spent USD 4,704
per capita on health care and Switzerland, USD 3,529. Hence, 10 percent more HCE
amounts to USD 470 and USD 353, respectively. The comparison with the estimates in
Eqs. (2.8) and (2.9) clearly shows that in both countries, WTP for increased certainty
with regard to age at death exceeds their marginal cost in terms of HCE. Therefore,
one can answer Q4 by concluding that even if HCE should not prolong life anymore,
it may be worth its cost as ”real insurance” reducing the variability of health status.
2.7 Conclusion
This study addresses an issue that has been overlooked in the production of health lit-
erature with its emphasis on flat-of-the-curve medicine. For risk-averse individuals, not
only the level of health but also its variability is important. However, improved control
over health status is reflected in an increased rectangularization of the survival curve,
indicating a reduced variability of age at death (VAD). Since this rectangularization
can indeed be observed in OECD countries, this raises four research questions. Are the
countries of our sample characterized by flat-of-the-curve medicine (Q1)? Do medical
or non-medical factors contribute more to reducing VAD (Q2)? Do these effects differ
among the elderly, where rectangularization has been prominent (Q3)? Is flat-of-the-
curve medicine wasteful (Q4)? The standard deviation (sd) of age at death serves as
an indicator of overall uncertainty concerning health status and the sd above the mode
(where the number of deaths in adulthood reaches its maximum) as an indicator of
uncertainty surrounding health status among the elderly. Between 1960 and 2005 both
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measures decreased for the 24 OECD countries sampled, pointing to reduced VAD.
However, sd above the mode began to fall in the early 1980s only. These two indicators
are related to HCE as a proxy of medical inputs to the production of health and to
GDP and alcohol consumption as a proxy of non-medical ones. Based on a specification
that takes account of hidden heterogeneity through random effects, the four research
questions can be answered as follows.
Q1: According to our estimates the critical value of HCE beyond which its marginal
effect ceases to be positive can be put at USD 1,675. With a mean value of USD
3,436 as of 2005, the OECD countries of our sample are on average well within
the flat-of-the-curve range.
Q2: The reduction of VAD (indicating better control over health status) is importantly
due to both, HCE and GDP.
Q3: Significant effects of HCE and GDP on VAD among the elderly are found for the
time period between 1983 to 2005 only, of a magnitude comparable to Q2.
Q4: Comparing the marginal cost in terms of HCE with the willingness-to-pay values
for the United States and Switzerland, we find that the benefits in terms of
reduced VAD exceed the extra cost. Therefore, flat-of-the-curve medicine may be
worthwhile as ”real insurance” serving to reduce unvertainty of health status.
However, several limitations of this study need to be pointed out. First, variability of
health status as experienced by individuals is only crudely measured by cross-sectional
measures such as the standard deviation of age at death. Tracking individual’s health
status over time would be preferable, but availability of panel data would restrict the
analysis to a few countries only. Second, medical and especially non-medical inputs to
the production of health are not very well captured by HCE and GDP and alcohol
consumption per capita, respectively. Unfortunately, measures of education and other
indicators of lifestyle do not date back sufficiently far for many OECD countries.
Third, we used a coefficient of absolute risk aversion derived from U.S. data. Its value
likely differs between countries.
However, the findings on the whole do suggest that variability of health status can be
influenced. This has important implications. First, reduced uncertainty about age at
death likely has been modifying the decisions especially of older individuals concerning
savings, consumptions, and the purchase of life and long-term care insurance. Quite
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generally, it helps risk-averse individuals to optimize lifetime consumption, permitting
them to reduce precautionary saving (see Palumbo, 1999 and Levhari and Mirman,
1977). Second, knowing the extent and determinants of variability of health status
enables insurers and reinsurers to calculate more accurate values of the financial risk
they are exposed to and expected to face in the future in different countries. Finally, our
study suggests complementing the economic evaluation of medical interventions (such
as cost-utility or cost-effectiveness analysis) with possible reductions in the uncertainty
of outcomes.
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Appendix
In general terms, the Gini coefficient is defined as the area between the diagonal and
the Lorenz curve, divided by the whole area below the diagonal (see Figure 2.4). In
applications to income, the Lorenz curve represents the cumulative income share as a
function of the cumulative population share (Lorenz, 1970). Following Hanada (1983),
the Gini coefficient can be applied to life tables as follows. Let x be years lived rather
than income. In order to measure the number of years lived, the person’s death must
be observed. Therefore the density function of x is redefined as
fx =
dx
l0
, (2.10)
with dx denoting the number of deaths at age x and l0 the number of survivors at year
0 (standardized to 100,000). The cumulative distribution function can be written as
Fx =
n−1∑
x=0
fx. (2.11)
It defines the horizontal axis of Figure 2.4, with n denoting the oldest age in the life
table. The share of the total amount of years lived by the share Fx of the population is
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Φx =
n−1∑
x=0
(
dxx∑n−1
x=0 dxx
), (2.12)
representing the vertical axis of Figure 2.4. The Lorenz curve is defined over [0, 1], the
range of Fx. In a situation of perfect equality, the share of the population Fx coincides
with its share in the total of life years lived, Φx. Therefore, the Lorenz curve runs
diagonal in this case, from point (0, 0) to (1, 1). The higher the variability in years
lived across a population, the greater the divergence between the diagonal and the
Lorenz curve. Noting that the total area below the diagonal is 0.5 and integrating the
Figure 2.4: Lorenz curve for length of life, U.S. males (1960)
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areas stepwise7, one obtains the Gini coefficient by using Eqs. (2.11) and (2.12),
G =
1
2
∑n−1
x=0(Fx − Fx+1)(Fx − Φx + Fx+1 − Φx+1)
1
2
, (2.13)
=
n−1∑
x=0
(Fx+1 − Fx)(Fx − Φx + Fx+1 − Φx+1).
The Gini coefficient varies between 0 (perfect equality and hence minimum uncertainty)
and 1 (perfect inequality and hence maximum uncertainty). It is equal to 0 if all
7The area between the diagonal and the Lorenz curve can be divided into trapezoids.
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individuals of the hypothetical birth cohort die at the same age (live to the same age,
respectively) and equal to 1 if everyone dies at age 0 while one individual dies at the
maximum age.
Figure 2.5: Standard deviation of age at death averaged over 24 OECD countries, 1960
to 2005
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Figure 2.6: Gini coefficient averaged over 24 OECD countries, 1960 to 2005
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Figure 2.7: Standard deviation for selected countries, 1960 to 2005
10
15
20
25
30
St
an
da
rd
 d
ev
ia
tio
n
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
Italy Japan
Portugal Sweden
UK US
Source: Human Mortality Database (2008).
Flat-of-the-curve Medicine: A New Perspective on the Production of Health 31
Figure 2.8: Gini coefficients for selected countries, 1960 to 2005
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Figure 2.9: Standard deviation above the mode for selected countries, 1960 to 2005
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3 Impact of Specialization on Health Outcomes -
Evidence from U.S. Cancer Data
3.1 Introduction and motivation
According to Lichtenberg (2007c) life expectancy at birth in 2004 differed by up
to 8 percent between U.S. states. Regional differences in survival rates for specific
diseases are even higher. E.g., 5-year survival rates for breast cancer vary by more
than 10 percent across different U.S. regions. In this study we argue that economies of
scale in the production of health explain part of the differences in cancer survival rates.
The existence of economies of scale in the production of health are quite plausible.
Lower production costs as output increases may be realized because expensive medical
equipment can be used more frequently and because of specialization in combination
with more disease-specific knowledge and experience. In addition, these factors may
also contribute to improved health outcomes. Moreover, the presence of economies of
scale facilitates concentration processes which in turn are the source of productivity
and knowledge spillovers further contributing to improved health outcomes (Krugman,
1991). Knowledge spillovers in medical care have been first analyzed by Coleman et al.
(1957), who find that physicians integrated in the community of their colleagues are
the first to adopt new drugs. Recent studies suggest that hospitals surrounded by
higher quality hospitals tend to improve in quality (Baicker and Chandra, 2010). In all,
one may expect that regions where more health is “produced” than on average realize
above average outcomes. Using data from the National Cancer Institute’s Surveillance
Epidemiology End Result1 (SEER) we analyze whether areas with relativly more of
the same type of cancer indeed exhibit above average survival rates.
1This database pools together information from all U.S. cancer registries on where and how many
people are diagnosed with cancer and their survival time.
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The study contributes to the literature of specialization as follows. So far it is widely
recognized that physicians or hospitals improve their productivity when specialized on
a narrow range of tasks. The positive relationship between volume and outcome is well
established (Gillis and Hole, 1996, Birkmeyer et al., 2003, and Allgood and Bachman,
2006). Based on these results a lot of studies recommend to centralize health care
provision in specialized units. E.g. in Maryland, health authorities require hospitals to
perform more than 200 open heart surgeries per year in order to keep their program in
good standing (Sfekas, 2009). However, especially for cancer treatment an analysis on
the level of a physician or hospital is too narrow for two reasons. First, physicians not
only work for one hospital, they often have operating privileges at multiple hospitals
and interact (socially and professionally) with other doctors. Second, when being
treated for cancer it is very common for patients to be diagnosed in one facility,
receive surgery in a second facility, have radiation therapy in yet another facility, and
be treated on an outpatient basis with chemotherapy.2 Through such interactions,
knowledge spillovers are expected to reach beyond the boundary of a hospital to affect
health outcomes of all patients in a region (Chandra and Staiger, 2007). Thus, possible
specialization effects may remain undetected.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 3.2 starts with a simple model on cancer
survival. Section 3.3 is devoted to the data source and the empirical estimation strategy.
The estimation results are presented in Section 3.4. Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 A simple model of cancer survival
The literature distinguishes three different types of survival rates (see e.g. Horner
et al., 2008). The observed survival rate (S ) is the probability of surviving all causes
of death for a specified time after diagnosis of cancer. It considers deaths from all
causes, cancer or otherwise. The expected survival rate (E ) is the survival rate of a
comparable set of people that do not have cancer. In turn, the relative survival rate
(R) is defined as the ratio of the proportion of observed survivors (all causes of death)
in a cohort of cancer patients to the proportion of expected survivors in a comparable
cohort of cancer-free individuals, S/E.
2E.g. the successful treatment of esophageal cancer needs an experienced team of inpatient spe-
cialists as well as experienced outpatient oncologists for the follow-up treatment (Hoelscher, 2001).
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The following model is based on Lichtenberg (2007b) and explains the survival rate as
a function of different input factors. However, instead of using individuals as the unit
of observation we use regions. We assume that the relative survival rate depends on
the treatment quality and the disease progression at time of diagnosis:
Rir = Sir/Eir = f1(Qir, Pir) (3.1)
or
Sir = f2(Eir, Qir, Pir) (3.2)
with,
• Rir: The relative survival rate for cancer type i in region r
• Sir: The observed survival rate for cancer type i in region r
• Eir: The expected survival rate of the control group
• Qir: Treatment quality for cancer type i in region r
• Pir: Disease progression of cancer type i in region r
The observed survival rate is hypothesized to be an increasing function of the quality
of treatment (∂f2(·)
∂Qir
> 0) and the expected survival rate (∂f2(·)
∂Eir
> 0) and a decreasing
function of disease progression at time of diagnosis (∂f2(·)
∂Pir
< 0).
Quality in health care is hard to define and hard to quantify. Lichtenberg (2007a) uses
treatment vintage to measure treatment quality.3 However, treatment quality is also a
function of knowledge and the extent of specialization. According to Birkmeyer et al.
(2002) low volume hospitals with less than 3 pancreatic resections per year report a
11 percent higher mortality rate than high volume hospitals with more than 16 cases.
In a follow-up study similar results are found on the level of physicians (Birkmeyer
et al., 2003). Thus, we hypothesize that treatment quality is an increasing function of
specialization. In turn, specialization is measured by Nir, the number of cancer type i
in region r :
Qir = f3(Nir) (3.3)
Substituting Eq. (3.3) into Eq. (3.2):
3The vintage of a treatment is the year in which the treatment was first used.
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Sir = f2(Eir, Pir, Nir). (3.4)
Our primary objective is to estimate the effect of specialization (Nir) on survival (Sir).
Thus our testable hypothesis is ∂f2(·)
∂Nir
> 0.
The observed survival rate could depend on factors other than specialization and disease
progression. It likely depends on the medical infrastructure, the availability of new
chemotherapy drugs (treatment vintage), and patient characteristics such as income.
However, since we will include region and disease dummies we are able to control for
these unobserved characteristics.
3.3 Econometric model and Data
The model in Section 3.2 includes the expected survival rate.4 However, the SEER
data does not allow calculation of expected survival rates according to the county
level. Therefore additional population characteristics such as age, race, and sex are
included for the county estimation.5 Based on Section 3.2 we estimate the following
model.
Sir = β1Nir + β2Expr + β3LOCir + β4DISTir + β5SURGir + β6RADir (3.5)
+β7AGEir + β8WHITEir + β9MALEir + ǫir
where
• r : Place of diagnosis (cancer registry or country); i : Cancer type.
• Sir: Observed survival rate for cancer type i and region r. Survival rates will be
calculated for five different time intervals.
• Nir: Number of people diagnosed with cancer type i in region r. According to our
hypothesis we should expect a higher survival rate for cancer type i in registries
with more diagnosed cancers of type i. This effect should be independent from
region and disease heterogeneity.
4Controlling for the expected survival rate leaves us with the survival rate of people having cancer.
5However, according to Lichtenberg (2007b) excluding the expected survival rate poses little risk
of biasing the right hand side variables since we control for the mean age of people diagnosed.
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• Expi: Expected survival rate of the control group. This variable controls for all
factors that influence survival in general (e.g. gender, age or race) but that are
not related to cancer treatment. We should observe a positive impact.
The next four variables indicate by how much the cancer has spread and are used as a
measure of mean progression of disease.
• LOCir: Share of cancer stage I or II for cancer at site i in region r in 2002. In
stage I and II cancers are localized to one part of the body. The higher the share
of cancers in stage I or II, the higher the survival rate is likely to be.
• DISTir2002: Share of cancer stage IV for cancer site at i in region r in 2002.
In stage IV cancers have often metastasized, spread to other organs, or spread
throughout the whole body. The higher the share of cancers in stage IV, the lower
the survival rate is likely to be.
• SURGir2002: Share of patients receiving surgery for cancer at site i in region r in
2002. When a surgery is performed as a primary treatment, chances are high for
cure, especially if the cancer is localized and has not spread. However, a surgery
can also be performed in order to remove as much as possible of the tumor in
order to make chemotherapy or radiation more effective or to just improve the
quality of life. Unfortunately we only know whether a surgery was carried out or
not.
• RADir: Share of patients receiving radiation for cancer type i in region r. Ra-
diotherapy may be used as therapeutic treatment where the therapy has survival
benefit or as palliative treatment where cure is not possible anymore. Therefore
the effect of RAD is unclear.
Since the expected survival rate is not available on the county level we include the
following individual characteristics in the county level estimation:
• AGEir: The mean age of people diagnosed with cancer type i. The literature shows
that among adults, relative survival decreases with increasing age at diagnosis
for almost every cancer (Cancer Research UK, 2006). Therefore we should expect
lower survival rates for counties where the mean age of people diagnosed with
cancer is higher. However we have to be careful with the interpretation of the
coefficient of AGE since it also picks up the effect of earlier detection.
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• WHITEir: Share of white patients diagnosed with cancer type i. Several studies
find higher survival rates for whites compared to blacks (Pulido et al. (2009),
Coleman et al. (2008)). Since the fixed effects model already controls for disease-
invariant characteristics the variable can also be interpreted as life style differ-
ences between whites and blacks. We hypothesize that counties with a higher
share of whites exhibit higher survival rates.
• MALEir: Share of male patients diagnosed with cancer type i. There are certain
cancer types that are more prevalent among women (e.g. breast cancer) or among
men (e.g. prostate cancer). Since we include cancer type fixed effects we control
for these differences. However, the literature on the production of health finds
consistently higher survival rates for females than for males (see e.g. Miller and
Frech (2000)). Therefore one can think that there still remain differences in the
survival rates due to gender even after controlling for different cancer types.
• ǫir: Error term
Data are obtained from the National Cancer Institute’s Surveillance, Epidemiology,
and End Results (SEER) program. It contains information from population-based
cancer registries6 covering approximately 26 percent of the US population. The reg-
istries included are San Francisco-Oakland (since 1973), Connecticut (1973), Detroit
(1973), Hawaii (1973), Iowa (1973), New Mexico (1973), Utah (1973), Seattle ( 1974),
Atlanta (1975), Alaska (1992), San-Jose Monterey (1992), Los Angeles (1992), Rural
Georgia (1992), remaining California (2000), Kentucky (2000), Louisiana (2000-2004),
and New Jersey (2000). The variables included are patient demographics, primary
tumor site, tumor morphology and stage at diagnosis, first course of treatment, and
follow-up for vital status. The variable of interest in our study is the survival rate.
Survival rates may be calculated for different time intervals. To assess treatment
effects for cancer the literature usually refers to 5-year survival rates. In addition we
also estimate models for the 1-, 2-, 3-, and 4-year survival rate.
For the purpose of our analyis we group each individual-based cancer record according
to region and aggregated cancer site. SEER provides two different geographical
identifiers (unfortunately not the hospital). We will use both, the registry and the
6Cancer registries are a systematic collection of data about cancer and tumor diseases. The ge-
ographic area of one SEER registry corresponds to approximately one U.S. state, except for the
Californian registries, Seattle, rural Georgia, Atlanta, and Detroit.
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county identifier, for the estimation. Table 3.1 contains the summary statistics for the
registry level according to aggregated sites.7 In total we are left with 272 observations
at the registry level. Survival rates are weighted by the number of people diagnosed.
Chances of surviving cancer one year, three years, and five years after diagnosis are
78 percent, 65 percent, and 58 percent respectively. The differences between survival
rates across registries are up to 23 percentage points. Table 3.2 shows the number
Table 3.1: Summary statistics (registry level, aggregated sites) 1998 to 2002
Variable Mean sd Min Max
1-year survival 0.77 0.19 0.21 1
2-year survival 0.69 0.23 0.16 1
3-year survival 0.64 0.24 0.16 1
4-year survival 0.60 0.25 0.14 1
5-year survival 0.57 0.24 0.12 1
1-year exp. survival 0.98 0.01 0.96 1
2-year exp. survival 0.95 0.02 0.91 1
3-year exp. survival 0.93 0.03 0.87 1
4-year exp. survival 0.90 0.04 0.82 1
5-year exp. survival 0.88 0.05 0.78 1
N 4,004 5,935 2 33,424
lnN 7.06 1.95 0.69 10.42
AGE 58.82 8.88 27.7 71.54
LOC 0.49 0.34 0 1
DIST 0.23 0.31 0 1
SURG 0.61 0.30 0 1
RAD 0.29 0.18 0 0.67
WHITE 0.77 0.25 0 1
MALE 0.51 0.25 0 1
Observations 272
Note: The survival rates are weighted by Nir.
of people diagnosed according to SEER registry and aggregated cancer site. Ideally
we would have information on the place where the diagnosed patient receives its
treatment, however, this is not available in the SEER data. There are two low volume
registries, viz. Alaska and Rural Georgia with 260 and 509 cases respectively and
three high volume registries with above 20,000 cases, viz. Los Angeles (29,232), New
Jersey (38,172), and greater California (63,147). The cancers less common are at site
eye and orbit (528) and bones and joint (659). In contrast, most common cancers
7In this study we use the 16 aggregated (to broad sites, following the National Cancer Institute)
sites based on the international classification of diseases for oncology, 3rd edition.
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Table 3.2: Number of diagnoses according to registry and aggregated site, 2002
Registry 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
San Francisco 371 2,891 1,924 34 101 582 2,677 920 2,843
Conneticut 304 3,020 2,216 33 104 649 2,395 901 2,809
Metropolitan Detroit 390 3,081 2,632 33 107 674 2,415 1,018 3,723
Hawaii 136 1,088 582 11 33 190 779 293 677
Iowa 289 2,480 1,802 22 66 541 1,911 744 2,116
New Mexico 143 1,111 770 16 45 293 960 391 1,223
Seattle Puget-Sound 370 2,696 2,188 33 80 842 2,773 947 2,911
Utah 129 978 424 16 41 351 891 367 1,425
Metropolitan Atlanta 233 1,474 1,170 24 78 537 1520 515 1,778
San Jose Monterey 166 1,374 831 16 61 316 1,222 434 1,434
Los Angeles 653 5,864 3,393 83 201 1,150 4,804 2,019 5,432
Alaska 5 86 47 3 3 1 41 7 27
Rural Georgia 19 97 93 4 2 14 76 27 91
GreaterCalifornia1 1,488 11,372 8,664 166 444 3,425 10,218 3,656 11,417
Kentucky 424 3,200 3,764 44 104 735 2,454 974 2,749
Louisiana 442 3,516 3,012 41 114 477 2,472 933 3,372
New Jersey 726 7,180 5,133 80 240 1,622 5,412 2,391 7,837
total 6,288 51,508 38,645 659 1,824 12,399 43,020 16,537 51,864
Registry 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 total
San Francisco 923 29 227 321 797 168 376 15,184
Conneticut 1,160 25 219 319 759 197 386 15,496
Metropolitan Detroit 1,201 29 250 329 794 238 452 17,366
Hawaii 250 1 47 129 194 45 101 4,556
Iowa 943 27 201 262 648 147 429 12,628
New Mexico 411 8 92 211 264 88 205 6,231
Seattle Puget-Sound 1,099 35 268 362 842 180 441 16,067
Utah 326 14 128 235 329 70 211 5,935
Metropolitan Atlanta 478 15 149 253 438 117 206 8,985
San Jose Monterey 442 19 114 163 415 89 211 7,307
Los Angeles 1,770 66 447 747 1,451 339 813 29,232
Alaska 11 0 4 7 6 4 8 260
Rural Georgia 36 1 3 8 21 9 8 509
GreaterCalifornia1 4,246 131 1,053 1,277 3,081 721 1,788 63,147
Kentucky 1,235 41 248 284 837 217 414 17,724
Louisiana 1,243 23 219 335 757 261 457 17,674
New Jersey 2,782 64 506 936 1,806 472 985 38,172
total 18,556 528 4,175 6,178 13,439 3,362 7,491 27,6473
Note: 0: Oral cavity, 1: Digestive System, 2: Respiratory System, 3: Bones and Joints, 4: Soft tissue incl. heart, 5: Skin
excl. basal and squamous, 6: Breast, 7: Female genital system, 8: Male genital system, 9: Urinary system, 10: Eye and
orbit system, 11: Brain, 12: Endocrine System, 13: Lympoma, 14: Myeloma, 15: Leukemia. 1: Excluding San Francisco,
Los Angeles, and San Jose Monterey.
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are at site male genital system (51,864), digestive system (51,508), and breast (43,020).
The aim of our analysis is to estimate the relationship between Sir, the proportion
survived, and the exogenous factors, X. As a first attempt, we will formulate the
model as a linear logistic regression of Sir on X, that is we will take the logit of Sir
and represent the response curve as a straight line:
ln(
Sir
1− Sir ) = γ0 + γ1X (3.6)
However, since we grouped the data (according to region and aggregated site) and these
groups differ in terms of size it is not possible to use a standard logistic regression to fit
the model. Thus, Eq. (3.5) is estimated using a GLM model with a logit link function
and a binomial distribution function where the denominator is the number of diagnoses
(see Stata, 2007). To control for disease and regional specific characteristics we include
fixed effects for cancer site i and region r. A significant coefficient for the variable Nir
would then imply that the ratio of the odds of surviving from cancer at site B to the
odds of surviving from cancer at site A is positively correlated, across regions, with
the ratio of the number of patients diagnosed with cancer at site B to the number of
patients diagnosed with cancer at site A (ceteris paribus, generalized to i cancer sites).
3.4 Estimation results
Table 3.3 contains the estimation results for the five different survival intervals. The
standard errors are in parentheses and clustered according to each registry since
observations within registries are possibly correlated (see Bertrand et al., 2002).
Furthermore, since the estimation is based on grouped data (defined by cancer type
and registry) and these groups differ in terms of size we weight the equation by the
number of patients diagnosed. Based on the Akaike and Bayes information criteria
a model specification with the logarithmic of the number of diagnosis is preferred
pointing to diminishing marginal returns of specialization (possibly due to increasing
coordination costs, see e.g. Becker and Murphy, 1992). In general, most coefficients are
of the expected signs. The effect of the variable of main interest, number of diagnosis,
is positive and significant across all five survival intervals confirming our hypothesis
that specialization leads to higher survival chances. To illustrate the effect, consider
the following comparison. Focusing on cancer of the respiratory system, the registry
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Table 3.3: Estimation results (registry level, aggregated sites), 1998-2002
Coefficients for (t)-year survival rates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
lnN 0.210*** 0.186** 0.216** 0.209** 0.189**
(0.078) (0.090) (0.088) (0.088) (0.078)
lnEXPt -5.340 0.378 0.973 1.456 1.683*
(3.519) (2.286) (1.758) (1.188) (0.992)
LOC 0.202 -0.005 0.024 0.174 0.209
(0.255) (0.216) (0.205) (0.177) (0.173)
DIST -0.830 -1.013* -1.047* -0.975* -1.078**
(0.514) (0.526) (0.534) (0.532) (0.530)
SURG 0.674** 0.594** 0.539** 0.493** 0.422*
(0.323) (0.302) (0.265) (0.231) (0.222)
RAD 0.510** 0.345 0.418* 0.405* 0.402**
(0.246) (0.245) (0.229) (0.208) (0.201)
AIC 9.88 10.69 10.96 10.88 10.82
BIC -523.83 -394.03 -354.15 -392.56 -416.87
LogLikelihood -1,306 -1,416 -1,452 -1,441 -1,433
Observations 272 272 272 272 272
Note: Fixed registry and cancer type effects are included, see Appendix; robust standard errors are
given in parentheses.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Los Angeles has the highest number of people diagnosed, 17,687 compared to the
registry average of 9,048. Although Los Angeles has above average numbers of cancer
of the respiratory system its 1-year survival rate lies 2.2 percentage points below (40.6
percent) the average (weighted) 1-year survival rate of all registries in the sample
(42.8 percent). However, this is due to the lower incidence rate of 12.3 percent for Los
Angeles (here defined as the share of cancer of the respiratory system to all cancers
within the registry Los Angeles) against 14.1 percent for the average incidence rate of
all registries. Hence, the relative number of cancers is crucial in determining survival
chances. Now, consider a registry with only few people diagnosed with cancer of the
respiratory system. There are 232 people diagnosed in the registry Alaska but the
survival rate of 42 percent - although lower than the registry average - is still higher
than the registry Los Angeles. Again this is due to the high incidence rate of cancer
of the respiratory system of 17.9 percent, well above the registry average of 14.1 percent.
The value of the expected survival rate (remember this is the survival rate of a
comparable set of people not having cancer) is only significant for the 5-year survival
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rate, but has the expected positive sign in all specifications (except for the 1-year
survival rate). An important determinant is the treatment variable surgery whereas
the variable radiation is only significant at the 10 percent level. SURG has a positive
and significant impact across all survival rates. A one unit increase in the share of
surgeries almost doubles the odds of being alive after one year. However, the effect
decreases for the longer survival intervals. The progression rate of cancer does not
seem to be an important determinant of survival. Only metastasized cancer reduces
survival chances considerably.
To test the robustness of our model we also estimated Eq. (3.5) on the county level.
The 17 registries are divided into 471 different counties8 leading to 7,093 number
of observations. Since SEER does not provide the expected survival rate on the
county level we include age (AGE), race (WHITE) and sex (MALE) to control
for population-specific characteristics. Table 3.4 includes the estimation results. In
general, as the sample size increases more coefficients tend to turn out significant.
The variable number of diagnosis is again positively related to the survival rate and
significant at the 1 percent level (except for the 5-year survival rate estimation).
However, this time the effects are smaller in terms of magnitude. E.g. the highest
effect is found for the 2-year survival rate. Here, a one unit increase in the log of
number of diagnoses increases the odds of being alive after two years by more than 13
percent conditional on county and cancer type survival mean. The lower effects are
likely due to the fact that specialization operates at a broader level than that of a
given county, e.g. counties sometimes only have one hospital. Moreover, since patients
are treated and diagnosed at different locations and counties sometimes only cover
small areas, results are possibly biased downwards. As expected the variable AGE is
negative and significant across all five specifications. An increase of the mean age at
diagnosis reduces survival. As in the previous estimation only the DIST variable is
significant and negative across all five specifications. The treatment variable SURG
also plays a more important role than RAD. The higher the share of whites in a
county the higher are survival chances which confirming the findings of Pulido et al.
(2009) and Coleman et al. (2008). In contrast, increases of the share of males tend
to decrease survival chances. To sum up, the results for the county level estimation
are similar to the registry level estimation providing evidence on the robustness of the
8We also performed a detailed estimation for the disaggregated sites, where we have 78 different
cancer types. For the most detailed estimation we are left with 26,363 observations
46
Table 3.4: Estimation results (county level, aggregated sites), 1998-2002
Coefficients for (t)-year survival rates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
lnN 0.096*** 0.135*** 0.134*** 0.104*** 0.054**
(0.032) (0.029) (0.027) (0.024) (0.022)
AGE -0.025*** -0.026*** -0.026*** -0.027*** -0.021***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
LOC 0.189 0.052 0.093 0.097 0.112
(0.127) (0.118) (0.107) (0.089) (0.105)
DIST -1.842*** -2.005*** -2.016*** -2.008*** -1.604***
(0.150) (0.148) (0.137) (0.124) (0.151)
SURG 0.868*** 0.806*** 0.707*** 0.602*** 0.320***
(0.088) (0.089) (0.078) (0.072) (0.064)
RAD 0.181** 0.060 0.085 0.086 0.027
(0.084) (0.071) (0.066) (0.056) (0.063)
WHITE 0.220* 0.278*** 0.233*** 0.301*** 0.297***
(0.120) (0.101) (0.0879) (0.0832) (0.0724)
MALE -0.203*** -0.315*** -0.356*** -0.347*** -0.249***
(0.065) (0.061) (0.062) (0.060) (0.074)
AIC 4.28 4.52 4.6 4.65 4.74
BIC -50,926 -50,687 -50,736 -50,793 -50,109
LogLikelihood -14,667 -15,518 -15,807 -15,995 -16,306
Observations 7,093 7,093 7,093 7,093 7,093
Note: Fixed county and cancer type effects are included; robust standard errors are given in paren-
theses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
estimated model.
Our study is subject to some limitations. First, the assignment of a given stage to a
particular cancer may change over time due to advances in diagnostic technologies. In-
troduction of new technology can give rise to a phenomenon known as stage migration.
Stage migration occurs when diagnostic procedures change over time, resulting in an
increase in the probability that a given cancer will be diagnosed in a more advanced
stage.9 The likely result would be to remove the worst survivors - those with previ-
ously undetected distant metastases - from the localized and regional categories and
put them into the distant category. As a result, the stage-at-diagnosis distribution for
9For example, certain distant metastases that would have been undetectable a few years ago can
now be diagnosed by computer tomography (CT) scan or by magnetic resonance imaging (MRI).
Therefore, some patients who would have been diagnosed previously as having cancer in a localized
or regional stage are now diagnosed as having cancer in a distant stage.
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a cancer may become less favorable over time, but the survival rates for each stage
may improve (Feinstein et al., 1985). However, since we focused on a given time period
impact of the introduction of new technologies are limited. Second, cancer survival
studies are often criticized that they find improved survival only because of improved
earlier detection and diagnosis of cancers - caused e.g. by new screening procedures.
As the proportion of cancers detected at screening increases, presumably as a result
of increased screening of the population, patient survival rates will increase, because
they are based on survival time after diagnosis.10 However, since we are controlling
for expected survival and cancer progression we implicitly controlled for this lead-time
bias. Thus, the increased survival rates we find are mainly due to specialization gains.
3.5 Conclusion
Since specialization is often made responsible for the growth in U.S. health care
expenditure, it is important to know whether more specialization is justified on the
ground of improved health outcomes. So far the results are mixed, e.g. a study by
Baicker and Chandra (2004) cannot find improved health outcomes for areas having
a relatively higher share of specialists. By way of contrast, our study suggests that
there are specialization gains on the regional level for the treatment of cancer. From
a simple model of cancer survival we derived the testable hypothesis whether regional
specialization in the treatment of cancer increases life expectancy. Specialization is
measured by the number of diagnosed cancers. Using data from the National Cancer
Institute’s Surveillance Epidemiology End Result (SEER) we estimated a GLM model
with a binomial distribution and logit link function. The results could not reject
our hypothesis. Patients tend to survive longer in those areas where relative more
cancers of the same type exist than the US average. Possibly, a higher prevalence of
cancers in some regions has led to greater accumulation of disease-specific knowledge
(also possibly through physician migration) which finally contributed to improved
health outcomes. Moreover, the results are robust to different units of observation. A
broader definition of the geographical area (here: registries) leads to higher effects of
specialization on cancer survival in terms of magnitude. Similar to the study of Becker
and Murphy (1992) we find decreasing marginal returns for the variable that indicates
specialization. They predicted that the degree of specialization is not only limited by
10The interval between the time a cancer is diagnosed by a screening procedure and the time when
the cancer would have been diagnosed in the absence of screening is called lead-time (Zelen, 1976).
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the extent of the market but also by coordination costs (e.g. the coordination costs of
organizing a whole team of cancer specialists).
The results of our study also conveys a message to individuals diagnosed with cancer.
They can increase their survival chances by moving to regions that have a relativly
high number of people suffering from the same disease. While this study is one of
the first analyzing specialization gains in the production of health on a regional level
further evidence is needed. Future research could broaden the level of analysis to
different diseases or to cross-country comparisons.
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Table 3.5: Summary statistics (county level, aggregated sites) 1998 to 2002
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
1-year survival 0.76 0.20 0 1
2-year survival 0.68 0.23 0 1
3-year survival 0.63 0.24 0 1
4-year survival 0.57 0.24 0 1
5-year survival 0.40 0.18 0 1
N 197.70 972.16 1 36,819
lnN 3.30 1.88 0 10.51
Age 61.18 10.91 0 94
LOC 0.47 0.37 0 1
DIST 0.23 0.33 0 1
SURG 0.60 0.34 0 1
RAD 0.27 0.24 0 1
WHITE 0.90 0.18 0 1
MALE 0.51 0.31 0 1
Observations 7,093
Note: The survival rates are weighted by Nic.
Table 3.6: Summary statistics (county level, disaggregated sites) 1998 to 2002
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
1-year survival 0.76 0.24 0 1
2-year survival 0.68 0.27 0 1
3-year survival 0.63 0.27 0 1
4-year survival 0.57 0.34 0 1
5-year survival 0.40 0.20 0 1
N 53.19 404.52 1 33,165
lnN 1.96 1.66 0 10.41
Age 63.10 13.59 0 103
LOC 0.51 0.39 0 1
DIST 0.26 0.35 0 1
SURG 0.59 0.39 0 1
RAD 0.23 0.31 0 1
WHITE 0.90 0.21 0 1
MALE 0.53 0.35 0 1
Observations 26,363
Note: The survival rates are weighted by Nic.
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Table 3.7: Complete estimation results (registry level, aggregated sites), 1998-2002
Coefficients for (t)-year survival rates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
lnN 0.210*** 0.186** 0.216** 0.209** 0.189**
lnEXPt -5.340 0.378 0.973 1.456 1.683*
LOC 0.202 -0.0052 0.024 0.174 0.209
DIST -0.830 -1.013* -1.047* -0.975* -1.078**
SURG 0.674** 0.594** 0.539** 0.493** 0.422*
RAD 0.510** 0.345 0.418* 0.405* 0.402**
Connecticut -0.019 0.004 -0.001 0.006 0.009
Metropolitan Detroit -0.149*** -0.129*** -0.130*** -0.121*** -0.110***
Hawaii 0.282*** 0.216** 0.238** 0.211** 0.183*
Iowa -0.059*** -0.029 -0.016 -0.002 -0.001
New Mexico 0.136*** 0.112 0.133 0.126 0.0939
Seattle Puget Sound 0.012 0.036 0.036 0.051* 0.055**
Utah 0.149*** 0.163* 0.200** 0.191** 0.168**
Metropolitan Atlanta 0.109*** 0.082 0.090 0.090 0.076
San Jose Monterey 0.276*** 0.256*** 0.283*** 0.268*** 0.251***
Los Angeles -0.228*** -0.212*** -0.238*** -0.234*** -0.217***
Alaska 0.860*** 0.682* 0.742* 0.670* 0.560*
Rural Georgia 0.483*** 0.346 0.496 0.485 0.442
Greater California -0.291*** -0.248*** -0.264*** -0.246*** -0.228***
Kentucky -0.074*** -0.085* -0.072 -0.069 -0.088*
Louisiana -0.132*** -0.136*** -0.129*** -0.121*** -0.133***
New Jersey -0.104*** -0.097* -0.115** -0.097* -0.087*
Digestive system -1.077*** -0.814*** -0.769*** -0.681*** -0.565***
Respiratory system -1.446*** -1.427*** -1.496*** -1.465*** -1.387***
Bones and joints 1.229*** 1.022*** 1.092*** 1.048*** 1.018***
Soft tissue incl. heart 0.507*** 0.497*** 0.573*** 0.574*** 0.572***
Skina 1.364*** 1.246*** 1.218*** 1.201*** 1.202***
Breast 1.106*** 1.049*** 0.866*** 0.786*** 0.753***
Female genital system 0.333*** 0.391*** 0.381*** 0.393*** 0.444***
Male genital system 1.685*** 1.526*** 1.372*** 1.403*** 1.387***
Urinary system -0.0373 0.182 0.241* 0.275** 0.334***
Eye and Orbit system 2.334*** 1.809*** 1.739*** 1.554*** 1.408***
Brain -1.022*** -1.188*** -1.079*** -0.904*** -0.836***
Endocrine system 1.541*** 1.773*** 1.838*** 1.832*** 1.810***
Lymphoma 0.127 0.178 0.260 0.412** 0.445***
Myeloma 1.012*** 1.010** 0.930* 0.824 0.780
Leukemia 0.755*** 0.940* 1.083** 1.161** 1.283**
Constant 23.570** -2.781 -6.005 -8.396 -9.347**
AIC 9.88 10.69 10.96 10.88 10.82
BIC -523.83 -394.03 -354.15 -392.56 -416.87
LogLikelihood -1,306.29 -1,416.13 -1,451.9 -1,441.15 -1,433.29
Observations 272 272 272 272 272
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. aExcluding basal and squamous.
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Table 3.8: Estimation results (county level, disaggregated sites), 1998-2002
Coefficients for (t)-year survival rates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
lnN 0.075*** 0.088*** 0.093*** 0.074*** 0.028**
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013)
AGE -0.037*** -0.038*** -0.039*** -0.038*** -0.029***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
LOC 0.231*** 0.113** 0.078* 0.063 0.106**
(0.053) (0.050) (0.046) (0.042) (0.053)
DIST -1.344*** -1.587*** -1.637*** -1.631*** -1.307***
(0.062) (0.061) (0.058) (0.056) (0.071)
shareSurg 1.034*** 0.898*** 0.794*** 0.693*** 0.421***
(0.068) (0.065) (0.059) (0.058) (0.048)
RAD 0.307*** 0.094** 0.069* 0.047 0.029
(0.048) (0.040) (0.038) (0.034) (0.038)
WHITE 0.171*** 0.204*** 0.203*** 0.237*** 0.200***
(0.057) (0.056) (0.052) (0.049) (0.038)
MALE -0.170*** -0.236*** -0.267*** -0.256*** -0.207***
(0.032) (0.031) (0.03) (0.029) (0.036)
AIC 2.81 2.95 3 3.03 3.02
BIC -236,446 -235,789 -235,678 -235,606 -234,415
LogLikelihood -36,439 -38,371 -38,935 -39,318 -39,267
Observations 26,363 26,363 26,363 26,363 26,363
Note: Fixed county and cancer type effects are included; robust standard errors are given in paren-
theses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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4 The Contribution of Managed Care to the Per-
formance of Health care Systems - Evidence from
Three Countries
4.1 Introduction
Health care expenditure (HCE) continues to increase at a faster rate than GDP in
almost all industrialized countries. Governments have tried to alleviate the pressure on
their budget mainly in two different ways. One has been to limit HCE by regulation,
the other, to introduce competition in an attempt to increase efficiency (Cutler et al.,
2000). Since the first option has not proved too successful, more and more countries
are seeking ways to enhance competition, among them by fostering Managed Care
(MC). By vertically integrating health insurance and health care provision, MC may
improve the allocation of resources in health care while limiting HCE.
Indeed, most of the current literature on MC focuses on its impact on HCE. Based
on the Rand Health Insurance Experiment, Manning et al. (1984) studied the effect
of MC on the utilization of health care services and on the level of HCE. They had
randomly assigned a group of 1,580 persons to receive care free of charge from either a
fee-for-service physician of their choice (representing conventional care) or a physician
participating in a Health Maintenance Organization (HMO, representing MC). In
addition, a group of 733 individuals, already enrolled in a HMO, constituted a control
group. The crucial innovation of this study was that participants were assigned to
plans, which served to avoid risk selection effects, causing healthier individuals to
enroll in MC plans. Both groups enrolled in the MC plan had 40 percent fewer
inpatient admission levels than those assigned to the conventional insurance plan.
Their total HCE was about 25 percent lower than under conventional care.
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Cutler et al. (2000) analyzed the effect of MC on the cost of treatment of one partic-
ular disease. They compared the treatment of heart disease in Health Maintenance
Organizations (HMOs) and traditional insurance plans using two datasets from Mas-
sachusetts. For the HMOs they found 30 to 40 percent lower HCE than for traditional
plans, mainly due to differences in unit prices. They concluded that MC may yield
substantial increases in measured productivity relative to traditional insurance. Using
Swiss panel data, Lehmann and Zweifel (2004) were able to distinguish cost savings
due to risk selection and due to innovation effects. They found some evidence of risk
selection effects, which however, accounted for only one-third of the cost advantage in
the case of HMOs, with the remainder attributed to innovation effects.
This paper follows a more comprehensive (but more descriptive) approach by assessing
the contribution of MC to the performance of an entire health care system. Perfor-
mance is measured using five standard criteria developed for the assessment of an
economy. They are (1) matching of consumer preferences, (2) technical efficiency, (3)
adaptive capacity, (4) dynamic efficiency, and (5) a rent-free distribution of income
that provides incentives for producers to attain criteria (1) through (4). These criteria
are applied to the three contractual relationships typically characterizing a health care
system, viz. (a) between the insured and patients and health insurers (the government
as it were in the case of National Health Service-type systems); (b) between insurers
(the government, respectively) and health care providers; and (c) between the insured
and patients and health care providers. The countries to be analyzed according to
these five criteria and three contractual relationships are Germany, the Netherlands,
and Switzerland. This choice can be justified for the following reasons. First, all three
are insurance-based, which facilitates the comparison. Second, elements of MC were
introduced in all three countries during the last few years. Third, the Netherlands
underwent an important reform of their health care system in 2006, which allows to
test the hypothesis that the contribution of MC to system performance depends on
the institutional framework.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 contains the definition of MC and an
explanation of the criteria for measuring performance. In Section 4.3, these criteria
are applied to the three contractual relationships of a health care system before
the introduction of MC. Finally, the contribution of MC to the performance of the
three health care systems is assessed in Section 4.4 by applying the criteria to the
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contractual relationships after the introduction of MC. The last section concludes.
4.2 Analytical framework
4.2.1 The common building block of health care systems and
the scope of Managed Care
The common building block of all health care systems is the relationship between
the patient (the principal in the economic theory of contract) and the physician (the
agent). Patients experience a significant informational disadvantage, causing them
to delegate decision-making authority to the physician. In particular, they may at
best observe the outcome of a treatment, but not physician effort. For the physician,
however, additional effort is costly, at the very least in terms of leisure forgone. This
fact alone prevents physicians from being a perfect agent of their patients. Generally,
physicians will set their effort at a level they consider optimal from their own point
of view. Since it is in general impossible for the patient to find the payment function
inducing the optimal treatment effort by the physician, there is scope for comple-
mentary agents who promise to mend the physician-patient relationship (Zweifel, 1998).
In Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland health insurers (in Germany med-
ical associations as well) represent the dominant complementary agents. However,
complementary agents induce new information asymmetries leading to moral hazard
and adverse selection effects. Specifically, insured patients tend to consume more
health care services than medically necessary. The objective of MC is therefore to
rearrange the relationship between these three players in order to mitigate information
asymmetries and enhance efficiency as well as to optimize the allocation of the health
care resources used (Finsterwald, 2004).
Different forms of MC exist, including Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs),
Preferred Provider Organizations (PPOs), and Independent Practice Associations
(IPAs). They integrate insurance and provision of health care services, however to a
different extent. This integration is designed to reduce moral hazard effects between
health care service provider and insurer, to optimize the use of health care resources
(e.g. by avoiding double visits), and to better structure treatment processes. To this
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end, MC organizations listed above apply different instruments, such as selective
contracting, gatekeeping, and disease management (Amelung, 2007, Felder, 2003). In
the following we will analyze the impact of MC on the performance of health care
systems. The criteria used for evaluation are presented below.
4.2.2 Evaluation criteria
The five criteria listed below were originally developed for the assessment of an economy
in general. Zweifel (2006) adapted them to the health care sector in the following way.
1. Matching of consumer preferences: Health care services should match the prefer-
ences of the insured, who are assumed to decide about the types of medical care
that should be covered by insurance before they are ill.
2. Technical efficiency: The health care services that are provided according to cri-
terion (1) should be produced at least cost.
3. Adaptive capacity: The insured as well as insurers and health care providers
should adapt e.g. to population ageing or to medical technical change.
4. Dynamic efficiency: The health care sector should have an optimal mix of product
innovation (goods with changed characteristics that may fetch a higher price)
and process innovation (unchanged goods at lower cost and price). In general,
insurance-induced moral hazard biases this mix in favor of product innovation
(Zweifel et al., 2009).
5. Income distribution according to performance: Providers of health care services
should not be able to enjoy monopolistic rents (e.g. incomes that exceed the
amount that is necessary to keep them in their current activity). Rents jeopardize
the attainment of the other four criteria because providers lack the incentive to
make the pertinent efforts.
These criteria are applied to the three contractual relationships characterizing a health
care system defined in section 2.1. Each time, the issue is whether MC contributes to
the improvement of the contractual relationship in the light of the five criteria.
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4.3 The contractual relationships prior to Man-
aged Care in Germany, the Netherlands, and
Switzerland
First, the health care systems of Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland will be
described prior to MC using criteria (1) to (5). This is somewhat difficult for the
Netherlands since some MC elements have been part of the health care system for a
long time.
4.3.1 The contractual relationship between consumers and
health insurers
In all the three countries, consumers can choose among different health insurers.
However, insurance policies are highly regulated. The government not only limits the
range of admissible premiums (contribution rates, respectively in Germany), but also
the treatments to be covered. Only in the Netherlands, cost-effectiveness constitutes
a criterion for the inclusion or exclusion of benefits (Schreyoegg et al., 2005). Dutch
and Swiss health insurers have more freedom to launch different types of insurance
policies than their German counterparts (Schut and de Ven, 2005 Becker et al., 2007).
In Germany, only private health insurers have the right to differentiate their products
(Jacobs and Schulze, 2006).
Clearly, the obligation for health insurers to offer largely uniform insurance policies
makes it difficult to match consumer preferences, to quickly adapt to changes of the
economic environment, and to sustain technical and dynamic efficiency. Therefore,
criteria (1) through (4) are violated (see Table 4.1). However, competition for consumers
has been enough in the three countries to prevent the creation of rents [criterion (5)]
(Zweifel, 2006).
4.3.2 The contractual relationship between health insurers
and health care providers
In Germany and Switzerland, health insurers are subject to an ’any-willing-provider’
clause, i.e. they are forced by law to contract with every approved physician. In
the Netherlands, selective contracting has been possible since 1994; however, health
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Table 4.1: Main violations of performance criteria prior to MC
Consumers-Insurers Insurers-Providers Consumers-Providers
Germany criteria (1) through (4) criteria (1), (2), and (5) criterion (2)
Netherlands criteria (1) through (4) criteria (1) and (5) criterion (1)
Switzerland criteria (1) through (4) criteria (1), (2), and (5) criterion (2)
insurers have been making very limited use of this right up to the present (Baur
et al. (2001)). Health insurers also lack the right of negotiating differentiated,
incentive-compatible modes of physician remuneration in the countries analyzed. In
Germany, the association of social health insurers and contract physicians negotiate
both the global medical budget and the nationwide fee schedule1 (Busse, 2004). In
the Netherlands, insurers have the choice between paying (primary care) physicians
either fee-for-service or using capitation (i.e. a fixed amount per enlisted patient).
Swiss health insurers must apply Tarmed (Tarif me´dical), a nationwide fee schedule.
For hospital services, German health insurers are subject to a nationwide fee schedule
(Pflegesatzverordnung). Dutch insurers have some negotiating leeway, which is however
constrained in several ways. In Switzerland, they are confronted with cantonal hospital
associations. For pharmaceuticals, all three countries impose a national benefit list
along with regulated prices.
Obviously, collective contracting and uniform payment schedules in Switzerland and
Germany violate criteria (1), (2), and (5). However, criterion (2) is satisfied to a higher
degree in the Netherlands due to more flexibility with regard to modes of payments.
4.3.3 The contractual relationship between consumers and
health care providers
In Germany and Switzerland, patients can choose their preferred physicians without
any limitation. In the Netherlands, they are obliged to see a primary care physician
first, which may not be in accordance with consumer preferences [criterion (1)].
Table 4.1 summarizes the rough overall assessment of the German, Dutch, and Swiss
health care system prior to MC.
1Medical associations and health insurer associations distribute the budgeted amount proportion-
ally accord-ing to billed activity between the primary care physicians of a given Land.
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4.4 Assessing the contribution of Managed Care to
the performance of the German, Dutch, and
Swiss health care systems
This section is devoted to an assessment of the contribution MC makes to the perfor-
mance of the German, Dutch, and Swiss health care systems. The scales used will be 2
points if MC fully contributes to the attainment of the criterion, 1 point if MC partially
contributes, and 0 points if it does not contribute to the attainment of the criterion.
Points will be simply added to obtain a total score. For each country, the assessment
focuses on the MC element that is most prominent, e.g. Disease Management Programs
in the case of Germany.
4.4.1 The contribution of Disease Management Programs to
the performance of the German health care system
The Laws on Health Insurance of 2000 and 2004 paved the way for MC in Germany
(The Federal German Ministry of Justice, 2006). The governments’ objective is to
foster the integration of hitherto strictly separated ambulatory and hospital care2. In
the MC setting, sickness funds3 are allowed to selectively contract with physicians
without the involvement of medical associations. Moreover, alternative forms of
payment, including capitation can be implemented. The government promotes three
different types of MC in particular, viz. Medical Care Centers (Medizinische Ver-
sorgungszentren), Independent Practice Associations (Hausarztmodelle), and Disease
Management Programs (Strukturierte Behandlungsprogramme) (Greiner, 2005, Busse,
2004).
The effects of MC will be illustrated for the Disease Management Programs (DMPs).
They have been developed to improve quality and cost-effectiveness of treatment re-
ceived by the chronically ill. So far the government has defined DMPs for four chronic
diseases, diabetes, breast cancer, asthma, and coronary heart disease. The sickness
funds receive payments out of the risk adjustment scheme4 for every individual en-
rolled in a DMP (The Federal German Ministry of Health, 2007, Wiechmann, 2003).
2Therefore, MC is known as integrated care (integrierte Versorgung) in Germany.
3In Germany statutory sickness funds act as social health insurers.
4The risk adjustment scheme is currently based on age, sex, gender, and the four DMPs officially
implemented.
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It was hoped that connecting DMPs with the risk adjustment scheme would provide a
stimulus for sickness funds to attract chronically ill people rather than eschewing them
as high risks.
Relationship between consumers and insurers
Preferences of patients are not considered in the definition of DMPs. However, partici-
pation in DMPs is not mandatory but offers an additional choice. Therefore matching
of consumer preferences is slightly improved. There is little reason to expect that the
chronically ill will obtain their treatment at lower cost because the DMPs do not
provide incentives to health insurers or providers for a better coordination of care.
Therefore, static efficiency is not enhanced. The Government determines the design of
DMPs, e.g. it decides (using lengthy procedures) which chronic diseases are included.
This does not improve adaptive capacity of the system. However, sickness funds have
incentives to support cost-reducing process innovation because the payment of the risk
adjustment scheme is fixed, putting them at risk for exclusive cost of treatment. This
serves to redress the balance between product and process innovation somewhat. These
considerations may justify the entries in the second column of Table
Relationship between insurers and providers
Thanks to selective contracting, sickness funds are supposed to become prudent pur-
chasers on behalf of their clients. One would expect them to contract only with those
physicians exhibiting a favorable cost-benefit ratio in treatment of chronic illness. How-
ever, physicians participating in DMPs lose their autonomy in medical decision-making.
Beside many other regulations, they must follow treatment guidelines and document
the whole treatment process electronically. On the whole, DMPs are unattractive to
physicians, who continue to have the option of billing fee-for-service. Therefore the
DMPs do little to increase the degree of competition between health care providers
and hence to improve the matching of consumer preferences, technical efficiency, adap-
tive capacity, or the avoidance of monopolistic rents. At least, the DMP guidelines
may induce providers to focus more on process innovation, motivating the entry +1 for
criterion (4) in the second column of Table 4.2.
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Table 4.2: Contribution to performance of DMPs in Germany
h
h
h
h
h
h
h
h
h
h
h
h
h
h
h
h
h
h
hh
Criteria
Contractual relationships Consumers Insurers Consumers (3) Σ (max= 6
Insurers Providers Providers per item )
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(1) Matching of consumer 1 0 0 1
preferences
(2) Technical efficiency 0 0 0 0
(3) Adaptive capacity 0 0 0 0
(4) Dynamic efficiency 1 1 0 2
(5) Income distribution according 0 0 0 0
performance
Σ(max= 10 per item) 2 1 0 3
0= No change; 2= improvement; 1= partial improvement. Shaded fields= MC helps to alleviate a
shortcoming noted in Table 4.1.
Relationship between consumers and physicians
In general, German consumers have a free choice of physicians but are expected to
visit the hospital recommended by their primary care physician. However, usually
primary care physicians place no restrictions on the hospital choice (BMJ, 2006).
In contrast, DMP-patients are constrained to select a participating physician. This
limitation is hardly compensated; in particular, there is almost no reduction in the
rate of contribution. But at least consumers are not forced to participate, justifying
the zero entry for criterion (1) in the third column of Table 4.2. Likewise, attainment
of criteria (2) through (5) remains unchanged.
In sum, the contribution of DMPs to the performance of the German health care sys-
tem remains limited (3 out of 30 points, see the last column of Table 4.2). The main
violations of the criteria prior to the introduction of MC (see shaded fields in Table
4.2) could not be offset, except for the criteria (1) and (4) relating to the relationship
between consumers and insurers. This limited contribution is mainly due to compre-
hensive and uniform regulation stifling any innovative action by sickness funds. For
the same reason, selective contracting does not produce the expected benefits for con-
sumers. Thus, DMPs fail their main objective, viz. improved coordination and quality
of treatment provided to the chronically ill. 4.2.
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4.4.2 The contribution of the Independent Practice Associa-
tion to the performance of the Dutch health care system
The Dutch government implemented radical market reforms with the Health Care
Act of 2006, the main objective being to increase efficiency by promoting competition
in all three contractual relationships. The act created a level playing field between
private and social health insurers, who converted to for-profit status. By March 2006,
every Dutch citizen had to explicitly choose an insurer and a policy. Competitive
pressure is expected to make better use of already existing MC tools, viz. selective
contracting and gatekeeping. In contrast to their German and Swiss counterparts,
Dutch health insurers can selectively contract with physicians (and, to a far more
limited extent, hospitals). Gatekeeping, requiring patients to first contract their
primary care physician, was also established practice prior to the 2006 reform.
The effects of MC will be discussed focusing on the Independent Practice Association
(IPA). The IPA is a network of primary care physicians who agree to act as gatekeepers.
The main objective is to use medical care efficiently, e.g. by preventing unnecessary
hospitalisations (Douven and Pomp, 2007, den Exter et al. (2004)).
Relationship between consumers and insurers
An IPA might endanger the matching of consumer preferences since patients have to
visit a primary care physician first. However, health insurers are more likely to become
prudent purchasers on behalf of their costumers, using their freedom to contract with
physicians who match the preferences of their members. Competition for customers also
forces health insurers to pass on savings to their clients and to adapt quickly to changes
of the economic environment. These considerations justify the positive entries for cri-
teria (1) through (3) in the first column of Table 4.3. In contrast, dynamic efficiency
and income distribution according to performance are not attained to a higher degree
because the mix between product and process innovation and provider competition for
patients remains unchanged.
Relationship between insurers and health care providers
Profit-maximizing health insurers seem to be at a first glance only interested in
providers that keep down cost. However, they need to contract with providers who
respect patient preferences to be successful since customers can switch insurers. Insur-
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Table 4.3: Contribution to performance of IPA in the Netherlands
h
h
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Criteria
Contractual relationships Consumers Insurers Consumers (3) Σ (max= 6
Insurers Providers Providers per item )
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(1) Matching of consumer 1 1 0 2
preferences
(2) Technical efficiency 2 2 2 6
(3) Adaptive capacity 2 1 1 4
(4) Dynamic efficiency 0 1 0 1
(5) Income distribution according 0 2 0 2
performance
Σ(max= 10 per item) 5 7 3 15
0= No change; 2= improvement; 1= partial improvement. Shaded fields= MC helps to alleviate a
shortcoming noted in Table 4.1.
ers’ freedom to contract exposes physicians to an increased intensity of competition.
Because physicians do not have the alternative of contracting outside the IPA (unlike
in Germany and Switzerland), freedom to contract clearly serves to enhance technical
efficiency. Moreover, beside cost competition there is still scope for quality competition,
making physicians adapt quickly to changes of the economic environment [criterion (3)].
They are also more inclined to adopt cost-saving process innovation since many are
paid a capitation, shifting the risk of high treatment cost on their shoulders. Finally,
physicians with an unfavorable cost-benefit ratio have difficulty striking contracts with
insurers. On the whole, these considerations motivate the entries of the second column
in Table 4.3.
Relationship between consumers and health care providers
Dutch patients do not have direct access to specialists. The restriction to see the
gatekeeper first clearly is not compatible with a matching of consumer preferences. On
the other hand, it does enhance technical efficiency by a more coordinated treatment
process, e.g. by avoiding double visits. Since the guidelines are voluntary, physicians can
increase their chances by adopting them, increasing the adaptive capacity of the system.
However, the IPA does not contribute to an increased satisfaction of criteria (4) and (5).
In all, the IPA of the Netherlands achieves 15 out of 30 points and therefore contributes
considerably to a higher performance of the Dutch health care system. Especially the
criteria violated prior to the introduction of MC are now satisfied to a higher degree (see
shaded fields in Table 4.3). These are criteria (1) through (3) in the relationship between
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consumers and insurers and criteria (1) and (5) in the relationship between insurers
and providers. The highest score comes from the relationship between insurers and
health care providers (7 out of 10 points). Among the five criteria, technical efficiency
benefits most, mainly due to selective contracting (6 out of 6 points). Apparently, the
changed institutional setting of the Dutch health care system causes the contribution
of MC to performance to be higher than the institutional setting of Germany.
4.4.3 The contribution of Health Maintenance Organizations
to the performance of the Swiss health care system
The new Law on social health insurance (KVG), effective 1996, established MC op-
tions, which had been introduced to the Swiss health care system since 1993. It enables
health insurers to selectively contract with physicians (but not hospitals for the manda-
tory basic package). The MC alternatives offered include physician networks (similar
to the afore-mentioned IPAs), Preferred Provider Organizations (PPOs), and Health
Maintenance Organizations (HMOs). In the following, focus will be on the HMOs when
discussing the effects of MC on the performance of the Swiss health care system. The
typical Swiss HMO takes the form of capitated local group practices, with physicians
as salaried employees (Lehmann and Zweifel, 2004).
Relationship between consumers and health insurers
In Switzerland, HMOs constitute an alternative to conventional fee-for-service policies.
They allow consumers to voluntary limit their choice of physician in exchange for a
lower insurance premium. However, government regulation prevents the premium re-
duction from exceeding 20 percent for the first five years of contract life. This is not
sufficient for the average Swiss consumer since market experiments show that restric-
tions of the freedom of physician choice have to be compensated with one-third of
average premium (Zweifel et al., 2006). The expression of individual preferences there-
fore is not quite perfect (see entry in the first column of Table 4.4). Swiss HMOs do
provide health care services at up to 63 percent lower cost than conventional fee-for-
service. About one-third of the amount is due to risk selection effects, while two-thirds
can be attributed to changed incentives (Lehmann and Zweifel, 2004). This prevents
HMOs making a more substantive contribution to technical efficiency [see the entry for
criterion (2) in Table 4.4]. MC was also expected to foster product innovation in health
insurance. However, prior to the introduction of MC, Swiss policy makers put a risk
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adjustment scheme in place. Such a scheme binds insurers with an above-average share
of young enrollees pay into the scheme. While this attempts to alleviate the problem
of risk selection it in fact punishes innovators. In this way, insurers adaptive capacity
fails to be enhanced. Next, MC seems to have encouraged switching by consumers to
a rate of around 10 percent by 2006 (Federal Council of Switzerland, 2007). In their
fight for market share, insurers can be expected to improve the cost-benefit ratio of
their products, thus contributing to dynamic efficiency. However, with uniform pre-
miums also imposed on MC alternatives, many insured are free to consume medical
services without any financial consequences, which is not compatible with a no-rent
(net) income distribution. These considerations lead to the remaining entries in the
first column of Table 4.4.
Relationship between health insurers and health care providers
Insurers’ obligation to contract with any willing provider is not compatible with a
matching of consumer preferences, technical efficiency, and an income distribution de-
void of rents. However, this “any-willing-provider” clause is not applicable to MC op-
tions that permit insurers to select physicians with a favorable cost-benefit ratio. With
only a small share of the population enrolled in MC alternatives (18 percent in 2006,
one-third of which in HMOs; see Federal Council of Switzerland, 2007), physicians still
can easily revert to conventional fee-for-service with its “any-willing-provider” clause.
Therefore, MC only partially enhances attainment of criteria (1), (2), and (4) while not
affecting adaptive capacity [criterion (3)] and rent-free income distribution [criterion
(5)].
Relationship between consumers and health care providers
Consumers signing up for a HMO accept limited physician choice. However, they do
this voluntarily. As long as MC is not the dominant type of health care provision,
criterion (1) is not violated. The remaining criteria (2) through (5) are not affected,
mainly because patients were able to choose their physicians freely prior to MC. Their
choice of hospital is restricted to the canton of residence (except if covered by supple-
mentary insurance), and MC has not changed this. In all, Swiss HMOs contribute to
a higher performance of the Swiss health care system (6 out of 30 points, see Table
4.4). As for the Netherlands, main improvements are found especially for previously
violated criteria (see shaded fields Table 4.4). These are criteria (1), (2), and (4) for
the relationship between consumers and insurers and criteria (1), (2), and (5) for the
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Table 4.4: Contribution to performance of HMOs in Switzerland
h
h
h
h
h
h
h
h
h
h
h
h
h
h
h
h
h
h
hh
Criteria
Contractual relationships Consumers Insurers Consumers (3) Σ (max= 6
Insurers Providers Providers per item )
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(1) Matching of consumer 1 1 0 2
preferences
(2) Technical efficiency 1 1 0 2
(3) Adaptive capacity 0 0 0 0
(4) Dynamic efficiency 1 0 0 1
(5) Income distribution according 0 1 0 1
performance
Σ(max= 10 per item) 3 3 0 6
0= No change; 2= improvement; 1= partial improvement. Shaded fields= MC helps to alleviate a
shortcoming noted in Table 4.1.
relationship between insurers and physicians. Matching of consumer preferences and
technical efficiency [criteria (1) and (2)] benefit most of the introduction of MC. How-
ever, government regulation such as the “any-willing-provider” clause in conventional
medicine and for hospitals, prevent MC from making a more substantial contribution
to the Swiss health care system.
4.5 Conclusions
This article proposes an innovative approach to analyze the impact of MC on health
care systems. Rather than just analyzing the effects of MC on HCE, it considers
economic criteria, viz. matching of consumer preferences, adaptive capacity, dynamic
efficiency, and income distribution according to performance, which determine the
performance of a health care system.
The contribution of MC to the performance of the German health care system
remains limited (3 out of 30 points). The DMPs, designed to improve the quality
and cost-effectiveness of treatments for chronically ill people, cannot fulfill their
expectations. Government regulation such as the uniform design of the DMPs, the
bureaucratic requirements for physicians, and the loss of free physician choice without
adequate compensation, prevent DMPs from making a substantial contribution to the
German health care system.
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In the Netherlands, MC contributes considerably to a higher performance of the Dutch
health care system (15 out of 30 points). MC together with the Health Care Act
of 2006 liberalized the relationship between health insurers and health care service
providers, making health insurers prudent purchasers of health care services on behalf
of their clients. Therefore the main improvements are found for the relationship
between health insurers and health care service providers (7 out of 10 points) and
for the second criterion, technical efficiency (6 out of 6 points). In Switzerland,
MC contributes to a higher performance of the health care system, but to a lower
degree than in the Netherlands (6 out of 30 points). Improvements are found for the
relationships between consumers and health insurers, and health insures and health
care service providers (both 3 out of 10 points). Among the five criteria, matching
of consumer preferences [criterion (1)] and technical efficiency [criterion (2)] receive
the highest score (2 out of 6). However, regulations such as the risk adjustment
scheme, the uniform benefit package, or the ’any-willing-provider’ clause governing
the relationship between health insurer and health care provider, prevent MC from
making a more substantial contribution to the Swiss health care system.
Finally, the findings suggest that MC depends on the institutional setting. The more
freedom to contract between consumers, health insurers, and health care service
providers, the greater the contribution of MC to the health care system. However,
further research is necessary to test this hypothesis.
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5 Fine-Tuning of Health Insurance Regulation: Un-
healthy Consequences for an Individual Insurer
5.1 Introduction
When premiums are mandated to be independent of risk, competitive health insurers
have an incentive to select clients whose future expected health care expenditure
(HCE) does not exceed their contribution. This consideration has induced secondary
regulation in the guise of risk adjustment (RA) schemes. Basically, RA makes insurers
with an above-average share of favorable risks pay into a fund, whose proceeds are
used to cross-subsidize those insurers with many unfavorable risks. The design of an
optimal RA formula is a widely discussed topic (see for example Lamers, 1999, Ellis
and Van de Ven, 2000, Glazer and McGuire, 2002, Lamers and Van Vliet, 2003a,
Lamers and Van Vliet, 2003b, Van de Ven et al., 2004, Beck et al., 2006, Jack, 2006,
Zweifel and Breuer, 2006, and Van de Ven and Schut, 2007). The RA formulas for
Medicare in the United States and the Netherlands are being refined continuously
(see e.g Douven, 2007 and Calfo, 2009). However, so far the consequences of this
fine-tuning of regulation for the risk management (RM) of insurers seem to have been
neglected.
This contribution contains a case study from Switzerland, a country that relies on
competitive health insurance in a way similar to the US and the Netherlands. A RA
scheme was introduced in 1996, using the two criteria age and gender only. Effective
2012, the RA formula will include a third indicator of high risk, viz. ”Hospitalization
of more than three days or living in a nursing home during the previous year” (see
Spycher, 2000). While this choice is largely dictated by service providers’ refusal to
pass on diagnostic information to health insurers, it does have several recommendable
features in that it (1) has significant predictive power (see Holly et al., 2003 and
Beck, 2004), (2) relates to a previous period so does not undermine insurers’ effort
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at controlling health care cost, and (3) can be measured at little administrative expense.
Refinement of the RA formula has gone much further in other countries. In the United
States, the CMS hierarchical condition categories model (CMS-HCC) has been in use
with Medicare since 2004. It uses diagnoses from all clinical encounters, regardless of
whether they are inpatient or outpatient (see Pope et al., 2004). In the Netherlands
diagnostic cost groups (DCGs) and pharmacy-based cost groups (PCGs) are used
as high-risk indicators.1 These reforms have their costs and benefits. On the benefit
side, risk-selection efforts by health insurers are reduced if the net cost of medical
care falling on them is increasingly equalized across risk types. Moreover, this net
cost does not depend anymore on whether the insured were hospitalized or not. On
the cost side, these refinements of RA not only require more accounting effort on the
part of both insurers and providers but also increase proneness to error2. Moreover,
they create incentives for up-coding diagnoses (for an explicit analysis of advantages
and disadvantages in the case of United States Medicare, see Pope et al., 2000 and
Kominski, 2007).
The purpose of this paper is to point out another cost of RA refinement. Indeed, it
may boost payments into the RA scheme to an extent as to jeopardize the economic
survival of an otherwise viable health insurer, posing a great challenge to its RM. Now
insolvency and hence market exit of an insurer who only survived thanks to cream
skimming may be considered to be efficiency enhancing. However, this case study
deals with an innovative health insurer, who had successfully implemented Managed
Care (MC) to lower rates of hospitalization. Bankruptcy of such an insurer would
have to be considered inefficient.
The evidence comes from simulating payments for a particular health insurer A into
the RA scheme applying the old and the new formula. These simulations predict
that A’s payments would have increased significantly, attaining between 9 and
13 percent of premium income. Extra payments of these magnitudes would have
seriously endangered insurer A’s economic survival, leading to a cumulative loss
1They are derived from the diagnoses related to prior hospitalization and prior use of prescription
drugs, see e.g. Van de Ven and Schut (2008).
2In the Netherlands, the complexity of processing the data and money flows led to errors in the
calculation of the ex-ante risk-adjusted capitation payments, resulting in a loss of Euro 247 million
(mn.), falling on taxpayers (see Douven, 2007).
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in excess of CHF 250 mn. (CHF 1 ≈ USD 1 at 2010 exchange rates) over three
years. While A’s RM response cannot be predicted, there are two main alternatives.
One is to enlist unfavorable risks, as intended by the regulator. The other is to
extend hospital stays from three to four days. This strategy would have decreased
this insurer’s RA payments by an estimated 11 percent in 2007. The consequences
would be unhealthy for taxpayers (who subsidize hospital cost), employers (who lose
workdays), and patients (who lose quality of life). While not directly transferable to
other countries with competitive health insurance (such as the United States, but
also Germany, Israel, and the Netherlands), the findings of this contribution convey
a clear message. Seemingly minor fine-tuning of health insurance regulation has the
potential of challenging an insurer’s RM, with undesirable consequences for the society.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 5.2 describes the method
for calculating risk adjustment values in general and the data basis. In the first part
of Section 5.3, RA values are simulated according to the new formula and applied to
insurer A. The second part of Section 5.3 analyzes the impact of this regulatory change
on insurer A’s RM. The chapter concludes with lessons learned from this case study
and its implications.
5.2 Simulation of risk adjustment values and data
basis
5.2.1 Methodology
Traditionally, analysis of RM focuses on payments between health insurers. However,
this neglects the fact that payments into the RA scheme are ultimately borne by low-
risk consumers while payments from the scheme benefit high-risk consumers. Economic
theory has always distinguished between payers and bearers of a cost or levy, in par-
ticular in the context of an indirect tax. To see the analogy, consider current Swiss
RA with two criteria age and gender only. Define P¯ as the community-rated premium,
L¯a,g, as the average HCE in one of the age-gender cells (a, g) of RA (neglecting admin-
istrative expense for simplicity), and RAa,g as the payment to or from the RA scheme.
The premium paid by a specific individual i who is a low risk compared to the cohort
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in the age-gender cell (a, g), and whose expected cost E(Li) is thus below average for
the specific cell can then be expressed as
P¯ = L¯a,g +RAa,g, with RAa,g > 0 (5.1)
= E(Li) + (L¯a,g − E(Li)) + (P¯ − L¯a,g). (5.2)
This particular low risk bears, on top of his or her actuarially fair premium E(Li), a
cross-subsidy in favor of high risks consisting of two components. The first component
is the difference between average HCE of group (a, g) and the individual’s expected
HCE denoted by E(Li); the second, the contribution to the RA scheme (P¯−L¯a,g), to be
paid by the insurer. The sum of the two will be referred to as cross-subsidization values.
As to the second component, the current Swiss RA formula comprises 15 age classes,
starting from age 19 to 25 and continuing in 5-year steps. Thus, there are overall 30 RA
categories. Since by law risk adjustment must not lead to a cross-subsidization between
the 26 cantons (i.e. member states of Switzerland), the RA values are calculated yearly
for each canton by the Joint Organization KVG based on data of all Swiss health
insurers (see Joint Organization KVG, 2007). Adopting the insurer’s point of view
rather than the consumer’s now, the RA values are equal to
RAa,g = L¯a,g − L¯ (5.3)
with L¯ (= P¯ in Eq. (5.1) since administrative expense is neglected) denoting average
HCE in the canton’s population as a whole (see Beck et al., 2006, ch. 4). Including the
criterion ”hospitalization”3 changes Eq. (5.3) to
RAa,g,h = L¯a,g,h − L¯. (5.4)
The subscript h is equal to 1 if a hospital stay in the previous year exceeds three
days and 0 otherwise. Average HCE of the respective RA cell, L¯a,g,h, now has to be
calculated for 60 instead of 30 groups, while L¯ remains the same.
The insurer has to contribute to the RA fund for favorable risks (L¯a,g,h<L¯). The RA
fund uses the proceeds to cover the deficits generated by unfavorable risks (L¯a,g,h>L¯).
3This is shorthand for ”Hospitalization or living in a nursing home during the previous year of four
days and more”.
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An insurer’s total payment (V ) into/from the RA fund depends on the composition of
its insured over all 26 cantons (c),
V =
26∑
c=1
1∑
h=0
1∑
g=0
15∑
a=1
RAa,g,h,c · na,g,h,c. (5.5)
An insurer receives payments if V >0 and contributes to risk adjustment if V <0.
5.2.2 Data basis
For calculating the RAa,g,h,c values in Eq. (5.5) for a given health insurer, the
cell-specific averages L¯a,g,h,c must be known. Since RAa,g,h,c is not published by
the Joint Organization KVG, two different sources are used to analyze the impact
of the new RA formula on an individual health insurer. The first is constructed
by merging individual HCE data provided by three large health insurers in or-
der to calculate the average RAa,g,h,c. Ideally it should be representative of all
Swiss health insurers. The second data base comes from the one individual Swiss
health insurer ”A”. Both are limited to individuals having mandatory health insurance.
Descriptive statistics
Data of the three large Swiss health insurers (out of a total of 70 serving a population
of 7.5 mn.) is available for the period 2001 to 2005. The sample is well balanced with
respect to gender (49.5 percent of women), and average age of adult enrollees (47.4
years in 2005, compared to 47.8 years of the adult population). The market share
covered is stable across age classes, amounting to 25 percent on average. With regard
to choice of contract, there is a clear trend towards higher deductibles. The three
highest deductibles (CHF 1,500, 2,000 and 2,500; CHF 1 ≈ USD 1 at 2010 exchange
rates) increased in importance from 12 to over 22 percent from 2001 to 2005, which is
compared to the official figures of 13 and 23 percent very representative (sante´suisse,
2010a). There is a similar trend in favor of MC contracts, reaching a share of 11
percent in 2005 (compared to the Swiss average of less than 10 percent in 2005, see
Eugster et al. (2010)).
The second data source, obtained from A, covers the period 2001 to 2007. With 51.3
percent of women, the sample is almost balanced. A is one of the medium-sized health
insurers in Switzerland with a market share of almost 5 percent in 2005. With 47.7
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years, average age of A’s adult enrollees is slightly higher than the 47.4 years of the
three insurers. The clientele of A also tends towards higher deductibles. The share
of the three highest deductibles (they are CHF 1,000, CHF 1,500, and CHF 2,500)
exceeds the nation-wide average of 22 percent in 2005. MC contracts account for
almost 35 percent (2007), double the nationwide average of 16.9 percent (sante´suisse,
2010b). This most likely explains A’s comparatively low rate of hospitalization (see
Figure 5.3 below).4 On the whole, A looks like an innovative insurer that encourages
MC options, in conformity with stated objectives of Swiss policy makers.
Checking simulated RA payments
First, the data provided by the three large health insurers had to be checked for repre-
sentativeness using the current RA formula. The values for RAa,g were calculated for
all 30 cells along with their standard errors according to the methodology described in
Section 5.2.1 and compared with the official nationwide values. The insurers on average
pay for women aged 19 to 25 more than CHF 1,700 per year (see Figure 5.1 for the can-
ton of Zurich, the leading canton of Switzerland both in terms of GDP and population,
and Table 5.1 of the Appendix for all cantons). Conversely, they receive payment for
over 90 year old women to the tune of some CHF 8,600. While the fit is good in general,
RA contributions by the three insurers are lower than the official figures from age 61 on.
Based on the evidence, one can conclude that the three major health insurers sampled
are sufficiently representative of the Swiss population to enable a simulation of the
new RA formula based on their data. This conclusion is also supported by the fact
that one of the three is a net recipient of payments from the RA scheme, one breaks
even, and one is a net contributor to the scheme. Also note that according to Table
5.1 of the Appendix, the standard error and hence variance of RA payments increases
with age, reflecting the fact that variance of HCE increases as well. This means that
for a risk-averse health insurer, risk-selection effort has a high payoff if focused on older
clients. By the same token, however, an insurer like A who counts on having to pay into
the RA scheme permanently faces a liability characterized by great risk as its insured
population ages.
4In the US, MC plans have achieved most cost savings by reducing inpatient hospital use (see
Miller and Luft, 1997 and Bindman et al., 2005. For MC cost savings in Switzerland see Lehmann
and Zweifel, 2004).
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Figure 5.1: Official RA values according to age and gender, canton of Zurich, CHF
(2005)
Figure 5.2: Estimated RA values with and without hospitalization according to age
and gender, canton of Zurich, CHF (2005)
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5.3 Simulating the impacts of the new RA formula
In this section, estimated RA values with the new RA formula including hospitalization
during the previous year are presented first. Then, the impacts of the regulatory fine-
tuning on health insurer A in terms of financial burden and choice of strategy are
shown.
5.3.1 Risk adjustment with the new criterion
Official RA values grouped according to the additional criterion, ”Hospitalization dur-
ing the previous year” are not available.5 They have been simulated using the individual
HCE data provided by the three major health insurers (see Section 5.2.2). Figure 5.2
illustrates estimated RAa,g,h,c values for the canton of Zurich.
Comparing Figures 5.1 and 5.2 the new formula is seen to induce radical changes. First
of all, it causes the amount of cross-subsidization between those without a hospital
stay in the previous year to shrink considerably beyond age 70. Conversely, it causes
persons with a hospital stay to be cross-subsidized regardless of age or gender. Second,
and related to this, the usual age profile ceases to exist. For instance, hospitalized
women in the 19 to 25 age group benefit more than the three next older groups, and at
the high end, it is the aged 86 to 90 rather than the oldest that benefit most. Among
men, the age profile becomes almost level beyond age 70. Third, the per capita amounts
now are higher, pointing to a substantial increase in the volume of cross-subsidization.
Eugster et al. (2010) simulate the effects of introducing the third criterion on the total
volume of cross-subsidization for 2005. They find an increase of 40 percent, from CHF
4.13 billion to CHF 5.82 billion, or some 12 percent of Swiss HCE. Whether this is
excessive or not is an issue that cannot be addressed in this paper. However, a change
of this magnitude is likely to present a challenge to the RM of at least some health
insurers. Whether this is the case of insurer A is the topic of the two subsections below.
5.3.2 Impacts on risk adjustment payments by health
insurer A
The consequences of adding the new risk adjuster ”hospitalization” for health insurer
A can be simulated as follows. The volume of payments is calculated as the number of
5Official statistics do show RA values as ”RA payments between consumers”, but only according
to the current RA formula (see Joint Organization KVG, 2007).
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A’s customers in a RA cell6, times the estimated RA value pertaining to that RA cell,
and adding up (see Eq. (5.5), Section 5.2.1). These calculations are performed using
the old and the new RA formula for the years 2005 to 2007. They allow to ”postdict”
the consequences the new RA formula would have had if already in effect. The results
are striking.
• Total payments of A into the RA scheme increase substantially. Under the old
formula, they amount to CHF 24.2 mn. in 2005, corresponding to 3 percent of
premium income. Had the new RA formula already been in effect, they would
have reached CHF 101.6 mn., amounting to no less than 13 percent of premium
income. Considering that A operated at a loss of CHF 8.2 mn. in 2005, the
new formula would, ceteris paribus, have caused a total loss of CHF 85.6 mn.
(= 8.2 + 101.6− 24.2).
• For the years 2006 and 2007, payments according to the new RA formula are
estimated to be CHF 73.5 and CHF 82.3 mn., respectively, compared to the CHF
2.6 mn. and CHF 2.3 mn. under the current RA formula. In terms of premium
income, the shares would have been 9 and 13 percent, respectively, resulting in
losses of CHF 54.8 and CHF 86.2 mn., ceteris paribus.
• Payments of A into the RA scheme increase in all cantons. In some, A even turns
from receiver into payer, such as in the cantons of Vaud (VD) and Geneva (GE).
This precludes a regional restructuring of A’s business as a possible RM response;
for this reason, this alternative will not be discussed in Section 5.3.3 below.
Arguably, these developments would have jeopardized A’s economic survival. Starting
with the underwriting result, the combined ratio (defined as loss payments plus
administrative expense plus RA values relative to premium income) was very close
to 100 percent over the time period considered, viz. 102.3 (2005), 99.8 (2006), and
100.3 percent (2007).7 This is not fatal as long as the insurer is making enough profits
from capital investment (see e.g. Zweifel and Eisen, 2003, ch. 5), which was indeed the
case in 2007. However, the new RA formula would have caused the combined ratio to
attain 111.9 (2005), 107.5 (2006), and 110.7 percent (2007) respectively, amounts that
could not have easily been compensated by profits from capital investment. According
to Browne and Hoyt (1995), who analyze market predictors of insolvencies in US
6For added precision, calculations are based on months of contract life.
7The expense ratio was 5.6 (2005), 5.9 (2006) and 5.6 percent (2007), which is average for Swiss
statutory health insurers.
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property-liability insurance between 1970 and 1990, a 5 point increase of the combined
ratio causes the insolvency rate to increase by roughly 22 percent. Even if this result
cannot be directly applied to health insurers operating in a different country, a 10
point hike in the combined ratio must substantially increase the insolvency risk of an
insurer who has limited reserves. The ordinance on health insurance (Federal Council
of Switzerland, 2003) requires insurers to hold reserves as a function of enrollment.
With more than 150,000 insured, A currently must have reserves amounting to 10
percent of annual premiums (Sante´suisse, 2009). If A would have used its reserves to
make up for the predicted loss of 2005 under the new RA formula, this ratio would
have fallen to around 5 percent. The predicted loss of 2006 and 2007 would have wiped
out its reserves altogether.
The insolvency of an insurer could be the result of lackluster performance and hence
of little importance to the economy as a whole. However, this does not seem to be
true of insurer A. It did incur a loss in 2005 but was able to turn this into a surplus
for the years 2006 and 2007. In addition, its high predicted payments into RA under
the new RA formula are due to its low hospitalization rates (see Figure 5.3). For men
Figure 5.3: Hospitalization rate, insurer A vs. simulated nationwide values, men (2005)
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(gray bars), they are significantly lower than the Swiss average (black bars) across all
age groups (women similar but not shown). While successful risk selection cannot be
excluded completely as an explanation, the evidence points in a different direction.
First, as stated in Section 5.2.2, the younger age classes and men are only slightly
over-represented. A systematic risk selector would have significantly higher market
shares in this age segment. Second, MC contracts (designed to prevent or shorten
hospital stays) attain a share of 35 percent in 2007, way above the Swiss average of
16.9 percent. At the same time, insurer A’s distribution of MC contracts across age
classes does not systematically differ from that of the representative three insurers.
Third, total HCE per enrollee and its age profile are quite similar between insurer A
and the three others, speaking against across-the-board risk-selection effort on the part
of the insurer A. By way of contrast, Figures 5.4 and 5.5 reveal a marked difference
with regard to the cost of inpatient and outpatient care. Starting with the age group
51 to 55 but especially beyond age 81, insurer A is markedly below the simulated
nationwide benchmark (Figure 5.4). Now this could still be due to risk-selection efforts
cleverly targeted at the healthy elderly. In that case, however, one would also expect
insurer A’s cost for outpatient care to be comparatively low in the higher age groups.
Yet Figure 5.5 shows that insurer A’s cost of outpatient care per enrollee is higher
than that of the three representative insurers, and particularly so in the high age groups.
These findings lend credibility to insurer A’s claim to have implemented MC in general
and home care instead of hospital care specifically for the elderly. This has positive
effects not only for the individual patient whose quality of life is higher, but also for
the economy as a whole. Indeed, the cost of outpatient care evidenced in Figure 5.5 is
only one-half of the true value since the cantons finance roughly 50 percent of hospitals’
operating cost. Implementation of MC concepts thus provides relief to taxpayers. Hence,
rather than acting as a ”cherry-picker”, insurer A seems to be among the foremost
in conforming with stated objectives of Swiss health policy, i.e. to achieve savings
through MC. Insolvency of such an insurer caused by a change in the RA formula can
be justifiably qualified as regulatory failure.
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Figure 5.4: Outpatient cost, insurer A vs. simulated nationwide values, CHF (2005)
Figure 5.5: Inpatient cost, insurer A vs. simulated nationwide values, CHF (2005)
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5.3.3 Impact on risk management
It is unlikely that an insurer confronted with the changes described in the preceding
sections can continue with its RM strategy unchanged. The two main alternatives
revolve around the two principal activities of an insurer, viz. underwriting and capital
investment. Starting with the latter, the insurer could seek offsetting returns on
capital investments. However, in the present state of the economy this is very difficult.
In addition, capital market theory predicts that higher expected returns can only
be achieved in return for more risk once the efficient frontier has been reached, a
consequence that is not easily accepted by a regulator of social health insurance. The
second possibility is to increase margins from underwriting either by increasing net
premiums or reducing claims. Swiss statutory health insurers have to pay by law
for all services included in the official list of benefits, with most prices regulated.
Therefore, it is not possible to decrease insurance claims significantly. Liabilities
arising from underwriting can be reduced by purchasing reinsurance; however, up
to present reinsurers have not been providing coverage against RA liabilities. This
leaves an increase of premiums net of RA payments as the likely RM response. Since
premiums are fixed by community-rating regulation, lowering payments into the RA
scheme becomes the preferred alternative.
One way to achieve this objective is to enroll more unfavorable risks, in particular
persons who were hospitalized during the previous year. This is the adjustment the
new RA formula was designed to bring about. The challenge to the insurer’s RM
now becomes to achieve more hospitalizations without incurring much additional cost.
Recall that a hospitalization counts as soon as it exceeds three days. When segmenting
A’s HCE function according to length of stay in the hospital during the previous year,
it turns out that patients with four days do not cost significantly more than those
with three. Therefore, A has to weigh the once-and-for-all extra cost of a hospital day
against the extra contribution from the RA scheme, which may amount to several
thousand CHF (see Table 5.1 of the Appendix).
The possible reduction of RA payments can be estimated as follows. While it may
not be possible to collude with the public hospitals (who obtain a per diem roughly
twice the amount paid by the insurer because one-half of their extra operating cost
is covered by the canton) to extend all hospital stays from three to four days, this
should be possible in 50 percent of all cases. The effect of such a RM response can
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be estimated with sufficient precision for the three cantons where A has the highest
market share [viz. Zurich (ZH), Berne (BE), and Vaud (VD)]. There, it would have
reduced RA payments by CHF 5 mn. in 2007. Extrapolating to A’s entire book of
business, one obtains CHF 9 mn., or 11.2 percent of the estimated CHF 82.3 mn.
Savings of this magnitude would have been important enough to induce a change in RM.
The cost of this change would fall on taxpayers (who cover one half of the increased
operating costs of public hospital through cantonal subsidies), employers (who bear the
workdays lost), and patients (who presumably enjoy a higher quality of life outside the
hospital). For this reason, reducing the length of hospital stays has been a stated goal
of Swiss health policy, notably justifying the introduction of hospital payment through
diagnosis-related groups by 2012 (DRGs, see SwissDRG, 2009). Thus, the fine-tuning
of regulation through an improvement of the RA formula risks to burden the economy
with sizable inefficiencies.
5.4 Conclusions
Regulation may pose unintended challenges to the risk management (RM) of a
company. This chapter analyzes the case of health insurance, where the imposition of
community-rating creates an incentive to select favorable risks. Risk adjustment (RA)
schemes have been implemented in several countries such as Germany, Israel, the
Netherlands, and the United States to counteract this incentive. They make insurers
with an above-average share of favorable risks (indicated by age, gender, and other
adjusters) to pay into the scheme, which supports insurers with an above-average
share of unfavorable risks. Since its current RA formula fails to neutralize the
incentive for risk selection, Switzerland will complement it in 2012 with the adjuster,
”Hospitalization of more than three days or living in a nursing home during the
previous year”. This seemingly minor fine-tuning of regulation is shown to have a
potentially fatal effect on a particular health insurer A whose payments into the RA
scheme would have increased substantially between 2005 and 2007 if the new RA
formula had been in effect. The reason is a low rate of hospitalization thanks to a
commitment to Managed Care (MC). Therefore, A’s most likely RM response would
have been to increase recognized hospitalizations by increasing length of stay from
three to four days, triggering extra payments from the RA scheme at a limited once-
and-for-all cost of an extra hospital day. The cost of this change of RM strategy would
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have been borne by taxpayers (through increased subsidies of hospitals’ operating ex-
pense), employers (through lost workdays), and patients (through lower quality of life).
There are lessons to be learned for other countries who impose community-rating on
competitive health insurers. First, it is practically impossible to fully neutralize insur-
ers’ risk selection incentive through an RA scheme,8 and be it only due to their different
rates of discount in estimating the present value of the benefits and costs associated
with risk selection. Second, perfecting the RA formula can have unintended side effects
at the level of an individual insurer that go as far as jeopardizing its economic sur-
vival in spite of innovative effort. In the case studied here, the insurer is even punished
for its innovative commitment to MC. Finally, the threat of survival may well trigger
adjustments in RM strategy that cause an efficiency loss to the economy as a whole.
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Table 5.1: Simulated and official cross-subsidies per capita according to age and gender,
CHF (2005)
Men Average* Std.error Min Max Official value
19-25 −2, 006.50 505.52 −3, 006.17 −707.84 −1, 963.87
26-30 −1, 227.59 833.80 −2, 165.91 2, 287.40 −1, 889.64
31-35 −900.68 678.91 −1, 733.38 1, 202.03 −1, 771.42
36-40 −979.03 421.93 −1, 749.27 247.62 −1, 624.49
41-45 −828.69 351.55 −1, 435.17 −40.31 −1, 398.94
46-50 −543.46 465.97 −1, 615.88 349.08 −1, 091.94
51-55 −109.82 378.55 −977.63 714.71 −624.63
56-60 290.34 300.27 −557.57 815.53 13.40
61-65 884.74 418.34 228.53 1, 648.89 771.06
66-70 1, 560.60 598.50 187.69 2, 464.57 1, 638.40
71-75 2, 535.19 548.54 982.57 3, 435.54 2, 873.43
76-80 3, 208.98 653.35 1, 884.58 4, 128.30 3, 845.50
81-85 4, 127.79 1, 361.80 1, 261.52 6, 983.73 4, 986.30
86-90 5, 286.51 1, 208.24 2, 752.09 7, 945.75 6, 880.09
90+ 6, 731.78 1, 513.63 2, 945.10 8, 915.78 9, 541.96
Women Average* Std.error Min Max Official value
19-25 −1, 772.99 494.20 −2, 780.08 −974.44 −1, 484.37
26-30 −1, 024.61 461.54 −2, 211.50 −311.71 −946.01
31-35 −746.06 559.49 −1, 694.31 −1, 125.73 −749.83
36-40 −961.00 328.45 −1, 576.69 −316.11 −924.81
41-45 −965.85 279.05 −1, 749.34 −535.99 −922.02
46-50 −732.01 309.04 −1, 295.60 −177.44 −646.82
51-55 −442.87 268.14 −1, 045.08 106.95 −235.80
56-60 −15.51 321.10 −512.16 841.85 205.36
61-65 443.65 247.14 19.55 764.95 737.31
66-70 981.80 395.53 210.13 1, 603.77 1, 415.39
71-75 1, 982.76 446.04 758.34 2, 662.32 2, 385.07
76-80 3, 136.84 656.22 1, 838.10 4, 406.12 3, 671.81
81-85 4, 641.23 775.55 2, 788.30 6, 111.25 5, 596.14
86-90 6, 917.12 987.66 5, 115.11 8, 382.98 8, 486.06
90+ 8, 672.75 1, 770.15 4, 464.86 11, 619.96 12, 457.28
Note: * Average over all 26 Swiss cantons, 1 CHF = 0.83 USD (2007)
Chapter 6
Conclusion
6 Conclusion
The conclusion first restates the findings of each chapter and their implications
followed by suggestions for possible future research.
Chapter 2 addresses an issue that has been overlooked in the production of health
literature with its emphasis on flat-of-the-curve medicine. For risk-averse individuals,
not only the level of health but also its variability is important. Between 1960 and 2005
uncertainty with regard to time to death decreased for the 24 OECD countries sampled.
This reduction is importantly due to health care expenditure and GDP. Comparing the
marginal cost in terms of health care expenditure with the willingness-to-pay values
for the United States and Switzerland, we find that the benefits in terms of reduced
uncertainty with regard to time to death exceed the extra cost. There are two main
implications of this chapter. First, countries operating on the flat-of-the curve medicine
do not necessarily waste resources, unless the variance of health status remains con-
stant as well. Second, the reduction of uncertainty with regard to health status can
also be interpreted as mortality inequality. In this respect, policy makers may also
be interested in the reduction of this inequality in addition to increasing life expectancy.
Chapter 3 suggests that there are specialization gains on the regional level for the
treatment of cancer. From a simple model of cancer survival we derived the testable
hypothesis whether regional specialization in the treatment of cancer increases life
expectancy. Specialization is measured by the number of diagnosed cancers. Using data
from the National Cancer Institute’s Surveillance Epidemiology End Result (SEER)
we find that patients tend to survive longer in those areas where relatively more
cancers of the same type exist than the US average. Possibly, a higher prevalence of
cancers in some regions has led to greater accumulation of disease-specific knowledge
which finally contributed to improved health outcomes. The results of our study imply
that centralization of cancer treatment is justified on the ground of improved health
outcomes. However, due to knowledge spillovers the level of centralization is not
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necessarily limited to the hospital level (as argued in many volume-outcome studies,
see e.g. Halm et al., 2002). Furthermore, since specialization is often made responsible
for the growth of U.S. health care expenditure (see e.g. Baicker and Chandra, 2004)
future research should relate the additional life years gained to the additional costs in
order to assess whether specialization in cancer treatment is justified economically.
Chapter 4 proposes an innovative approach to analyze the impact of Managed Care
on health care systems. Rather than just analyzing the effects of Managed Care on
health care expenditure, it considers economic criteria, viz. matching of consumer
preferences, adaptive capacity, dynamic efficiency, and income distribution according
to performance, which determine the performance of a health care system. The findings
suggest that Managed Care depends on the institutional setting. The more freedom
to contract between consumers, health insurers, and health care service providers, the
greater the contribution of Managed Care to the health care system. However, further
research should be based on empirical evidence. This may come from health insurance
data.
Chapter 5 analyzes the case of health insurance, where the imposition of community-
rating creates an incentive to select favorable risks. Since its current risk adjustment
formula fails to neutralize the incentive for risk selection, Switzerland will complement
it in 2012 with the adjuster, ”Hospitalization of more than three days or living in a
nursing home during the previous year”. This seemingly minor fine-tuning of regula-
tion is shown to have a potentially fatal effect on a particular health insurer A whose
payments into the risk adjustment scheme would have increased substantially between
2005 and 2007 if the new risk adjustment formula had been in effect. The reason is a
low rate of hospitalization thanks to a commitment to Managed Care. Therefore, A’s
most likely risk management response would have been to increase recognized hospital-
izations by increasing length of stay from three to four days, triggering extra payments
from the risk adjustment scheme at a limited once-and-for-all cost of an extra hospital
day. The cost of this change of risk management strategy would have been borne by
taxpayers, employers, and patients. There is an alternative that avoids the regulatory
spiral described here. Health insurers could be simply permitted to charge premiums
according to estimated risk. With sufficient pressure of competition, this would boil
down to ”price equal to expected marginal cost” since expected future health care ex-
penditure importantly reflects the insurer’s cost of enrolling an additional customer.
Conclusion 93
Wealthy individuals can pay a high risk-based premium out of their own means. The
same is true of low-income individuals who are favorable risks. The problematic group
are low-income individuals who are unfavorable risks. They can be entitled to an ear-
marked subsidy that kicks in as soon as their premium exceeds a certain percentage of
their income (see Zweifel and Breuer, 2006). In fact, the new law on health insurance
of 2004 introduced such a targeted subsidy in Switzerland - without however lifting the
premium regulation introduced in 1911. The consequence is an avoidable fine tuning
of health insurance regulation with its unhealthy impacts on not only an individual
insurer but also the economy as a whole.
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